



# AFTER-ACTION REPORT

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## Hurricane Katrina Response



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California Office of Emergency Services  
Law Enforcement Branch  
November 2005



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**State of California  
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## PREFACE

California state and local law enforcement agencies have been providing mutual aid under the authority of the state's Master Mutual Aid Agreement for over half a century. When Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, through her Superintendent of the State Police, requested law enforcement mutual aid to support their Herculean task in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the approving commitment by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger resulted in an unprecedented inter-state law enforcement mutual aid response from California. The California Highway Patrol, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the California Military Department, and the Governor's Office Emergency Services' mutual aid response to Louisiana would prove to be a history-making event that not only demonstrated our significant resource capability, but moreover, our collective resolve to meet the extraordinary public safety demands by an overwhelmed and grief-stricken people and government.

Volumes have already been written regarding the preparedness, response, recovery, and lessons learned pertaining to Hurricane Katrina. The scope of this after-action report considers only the actual law enforcement mutual aid process/response, and the observations and experiences of the OES Law Enforcement Branch's response to Hurricane Katrina, primarily those of Deputy Chief Robert Gerber and Assistant Chief Dennis Beene; both of whom deployed early in the aftermath of the calamitous hurricane.

Emergency management and public safety organizations throughout the nation have more than an opportunity to learn from this disaster, they have an obligation to plan for, and address the similar types of weaknesses and vulnerabilities as occurred after Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast.

*"...But missing from these exercises is a candid acknowledgement of an underlying cause of many national tragedies: the human tendency not to contemplate the worst possibilities, which are usually hypothetical and uncertain. Most of us don't want to imagine future problems and horrors that could alter life as we know it. So we don't.*

*The simplest and sometimes wisest response is to do nothing, which what we do most of the time. The result is a sort of Catch-22 of national disasters: We cannot address serious national problems until they are conclusively shown to be serious, but the required proof is usually the very crisis that we are trying to avoid.*

*In a democracy, it's necessary to mobilize public opinion to undertake unpleasant or expensive actions, but public opinion mobilizes only after the fact. In our world of crisis-mongering, we demand some means of distinguishing the real from the fraudulent. But the screening process is often an episode of national suffering*

*We do not plan, even when the case for planning seems overwhelming."*

*Robert J. Samuelson, Washington Post, September 7, 2005*


## INTRODUCTION



Hurricane Katrina was the eleventh named tropical storm, fourth hurricane, third major hurricane, and first Category 5 hurricane of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season. It was the third most powerful storm of the season, made landfall as a Category 1 hurricane just north of Miami, Florida on August 25, 2005, then again on August 29 along the Central Gulf Coast near

New Orleans, Louisiana, as a Category 4 storm. Its storm surge soon breached the levee system that protected New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain. Most of the city was subsequently flooded by the lake's waters. This and other major damage to the coastal regions of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama made Katrina the most destructive and costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States ([www.Wikipedia.org](http://www.Wikipedia.org)).

The current death toll now stands at 1,321<sup>1</sup> and the damage higher than \$40 billion, topping Hurricane Andrew as the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. Over a million people were displaced — a humanitarian crisis on a scale unseen in the U.S. since the Great Depression ([www.Wikipedia.org](http://www.Wikipedia.org)).



**FIGURE 1 – Path of Hurricane Katrina**  
Source: NOAA

<sup>1</sup>As of December 16, 2005

The follow-on disaster brought on by the flooding in the New Orleans metropolitan area created numerous escalating crises. Residents who remained in the city now faced life-threatening situations due to the flooding and inadequate or overcrowded shelters. Civil unrest and looting occurred in the city. Hundreds of residents were stranded in the streets, on roof tops, and on freeway overpasses. Hospitals, convalescent facilities, and funeral homes were among the facilities affected thereby exacerbating the medical and health issues. In describing the parallels between the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and the disaster in New Orleans, USC Professor Kevin Starr described the phenomenon that occurred in both places as a citywide “nervous breakdown.”<sup>2</sup>

By Wednesday, August 31, 2005, local, state, and federal public safety agencies, including the military, were performing search and rescue missions, transporting stranded victims, and trying to police the looting and other lawless activities. Public safety agencies in the New Orleans area were overwhelmed and required the immediate assistance from outside departments.

On the afternoon of September 2, 2005, in response to an informal request for assistance from the Louisiana State Police (LSP) to the California Highway Patrol (CHP), a conference call was conducted with the CHP and the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services’ (OES) Executive Office including the Chief of the Law Enforcement Branch. The purpose of the conference call was to discuss the LSP request and the official process and protocol for providing inter-state law enforcement mutual aid. It was determined at the conclusion of the conference call that an “advance team” of select command level officers from CHP and OES Law Enforcement Branch travel, as soon as possible, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to meet with the Superintendent of the LSP to determine the mutual aid requirements, and to perform the necessary official protocols for requesting interstate law enforcement mutual aid.



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<sup>2</sup> Article by Andrew Burmon, Stanford Daily, September 30, 2005

## HURRICANE KATRINA ADVANCE TEAM RESPONSE

On early Saturday morning September 3, 2005, a small number of CHP command-level officers and Deputy Chief Robert Gerber from the OES Law Enforcement Branch departed the Sacramento Executive Airport on board a CHP twin engine departmental aircraft enroute to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Table 1 below represents the advance team members and their respective titles and agencies.

| NAME          | TITLE                          | AGENCY |
|---------------|--------------------------------|--------|
| John Rolin    | Assistant Chief                | CHP    |
| Max Santiago  | Assistant Chief                | CHP    |
| L.D. Maples   | Lieutenant                     | CHP    |
| Mark Nalley   | Sergeant, Air Operations Chief | CHP    |
| David Qualls  | Sergeant                       | CHP    |
| Dan Maurer    | Officer                        | CHP    |
| Pilot         | Co-Pilot                       | CHP    |
| Pilot         | Co-Pilot                       | CHP    |
| Robert Gerber | Deputy Chief                   | OES    |

**TABLE 1 – State of California Advance Team**



Upon arrival in Baton Rouge, LA, late Saturday afternoon, the CHP/OES advance team was transported to the Louisiana State Police headquarters and training academy. Collocated at this facility was the Louisiana State Military Department. Also, the State Emergency Operations Center is located within this complex adjacent to the LSP department operations center.

The first order of business for the advance team was to meet with, and receive a briefing from Deputy Secretary, Colonel Henry L. Whitehorn, Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police and his command staff. Additional follow-on participants included a representative from Governor Kathleen Blanco’s office and legal experts from the Louisiana Department of Public Safety.

Colonel Whitehorn provided an overview of the situation in the City of New Orleans and surrounding areas. A few of the important key points expressed in the initial meeting include:

- No overall plan for the Hurricane Katrina response.
- Difficult to determine personnel strength and operational capability of New Orleans Police Department and surrounding Parrish Sheriff’s Departments (note: a Parrish is the political equivalent of a county).
- LSP assisting/augmenting significantly impacted New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). Many NOPD officers lost homes and had displaced families as a result of the disasters; many went absent without leave.
- No formal mutual aid system, similar to California, existed in the state.
- CHP mutual aid assistance would be needed to assist in various assignments in the New Orleans metropolitan area.
- Search and rescue activities were still being conducted by ground and air.



Upon completion of the meeting, Deputy Chief Robert Gerber, OES Law Enforcement Branch provided a draft letter of official mutual aid request from Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco to California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. This letter would serve as the official request for inter-state law enforcement mutual aid and would also establish, by delegating authority, LSP Colonel Whitehorn as the single point of contact and authority for requesting law enforcement mutual aid from California (see Appendix A for a copy of the official letter). At this point in time, the only law enforcement mutual aid requested was for CHP personnel, their patrol vehicles, CHP rotary wing assets, and the “Air Rescue 5” plus crew from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.

It is important to note that at the time of the advance team meeting and gubernatorial request for law enforcement mutual aid, the State of California was not an official member of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Therefore, the mutual aid request was promulgated under the authority of the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact (see Appendix B). EMAC, as administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), is an agreement between states to provide assistance across state lines when any type of disaster occurs (see Appendix C for additional EMAC information). Subsequently, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law, on September 13, 2005, legislation that allows California to become an official member state to the EMAC program and process. Appendix D includes a copy of the California state legislation signed into law.



**Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco requested Law Enforcement resources from California in an official letter to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (See Appendix A).**

## MUTUAL AID RESOURCE REQUEST/RESPONSE

After the California Advance team met with the Louisiana State Police, there was mutual agreement that the CHP would provide uniformed officers with protective gear and equipment, appropriate vehicles, and rotary-wing aviation assets. Furthermore, it was agreed upon that that CHP’s mutual aid assistance would be for 28 days and to include a relief contingent of officers at the mid-point of the agreed upon deployment. In addition, there was a request for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s H-3, “Air 5” helicopter and crew to support the Louisiana State Police airborne law enforcement and search and rescue operations. Again, refer to Appendix A for the official letter of request for mutual aid from the Governor of Louisiana specifically identifying the CHP and LASD personnel and resources.

On the morning of Sunday, September 4, 2005, a caravan of 116 CHP officers, 40 vehicles, and three helicopters departed Sacramento for the Louisiana State Police headquarters in Baton Rouge (see Appendix E for CHP agency press releases on their Deployment and subsequent demobilization and return). In addition, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Air-5 helicopter and crew departed Southern California for the same destination. Table 2 below, presents the break down of the initial and follow-on “interstate” law enforcement mutual aid response to the State of Louisiana Hurricane Katrina response.

| AGENCY | PERSONNEL/<br>RESOURCES                                       | DEPLOYMENT<br>DATE   | PURPOSE                                                             | DEMOBILIZATION<br>DATE                                                             |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CHP    | 6 Officers<br>(See Table 1)                                   | 3 September 2005     | Advance<br>Mutual Aid<br>Response Team                              | Not Applicable                                                                     |
| CHP    | 116 Officers,<br>3 Helicopters<br>40 vehicles                 | 4 September 2005     | Initial Law<br>Enforcement<br>Mutual Aid                            | Return to Travis AFB,<br>Northern California, on<br>15 September 2005              |
| CHP    | 117 Officer                                                   | 14 September<br>2005 | Relief Law<br>Enforcement<br>Mutual Aid                             | Return to Ontario Intl<br>Airport, Southern<br>California, on<br>29 September 2005 |
| LASD   | 10 Deputy<br>Sheriffs,<br>2 mechanics,<br>1 H-3<br>Helicopter | 4 September          | Airborne Law<br>Enforcement<br>Mutual Aid                           | Return to<br>Los Angeles County,<br>California on<br>14 September 2005             |
| OES    | 1 Officer                                                     | 3 September 2005     | Advance<br>Mutual Aid<br>Response Team                              | Return to Northern<br>California on<br>9 September 2005                            |
| OES    | 1 Officer,<br>1 vehicle                                       | 8 September<br>2005  | Agency<br>Representative<br>and<br>Emergency<br>Planning<br>Support | Return to Southern<br>California on<br>14 September 2005                           |

**TABLE 2 – California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid to State of Louisiana**

As the State Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Coordinator, the OES Law Enforcement Branch personnel performed the administrative and logistical coordination to transport the relief CHP personnel to and from their assignment in Louisiana. Initially, there was consideration and tasking to the California Military Department (CMD) to transport the first element of CHP mutual aid to Louisiana by military aircraft. It was later determined that it would be more expedient and effective to employ a ground caravan of vehicles.

Subsequently, the OES Law Enforcement Branch did task the CMD to provide air transport for the CHP relief officers from Southern California to Baton Rouge, while returning those initial CHP officers back to Northern California. This mission tasking of CHP personnel was performed using a C-130 type of aircraft. A final tasking of the CMG to fly the relief CHP contingent back to Southern California resulted in a request to the Federal Emergency Support Function #1 (ESF#1), which is the “Transportation Annex” of the National Response Plan.

ESF #1 is designed to provide transportation support to assist in domestic incident management. Activities within the scope of ESF #1 function include, among other responsibilities, processing and coordinating requests for Federal and civil transportation support as directed under the National Response Plan (NRP). ESF#1 chartered a commercial airliner to provide transport of remaining CHP officers back to Ontario International Airport on Thursday September 29, 2005.

Upon arrival and initial briefing from the Louisiana State Police, the CHP and LASD were provided make-shift lodging and feeding on the grounds of the LSP State Headquarters and Training Academy in Baton Rouge. This complex would become their base of operations for their entire deployment in Louisiana. OES Law Enforcement personnel were also billeted at the same complex. See Figure 2 below for an overview and brief description of the LSP facility.



**FIGURE 2 – Louisiana State Police Headquarters Complex, Baton Rouge**

The LSP command level staff worked closely with both the CHP and LASD for deployment assignments. “The 234 CHP officers, 40 patrol vehicles and 3 aircraft that were deployed to the Gulf Region aided in the rescue of countless stranded victims and assisted in the arrest of several looters. Officers also performed routine patrols and other law enforcement duties alongside their counterparts with the Louisiana State Police ...” (As reported in the CHP news release dated September 29, 2005. See Appendix E).



The CHP established a command-level presence at the LSP Emergency Operations Center complex and maintained close liaison with the LSP and the OES Law Enforcement Branch representative(s). The CHP utilized their Motorola Nextel phones to communicate with their officers, pilots, and OES. Cell phones also worked as a means of communicating albeit not as consistent as the Nextel radios.

The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Emergency Services Detail “Air Rescue 5” and crew received their mission assignments from the Chief Pilot of the LSP’s Air Support Unit and their dispatch section. LASD’s Air 5 performed various missions including: transport of emergency services and other key personnel, transport of essential life-supporting supplies and equipment; and numerous requests for air support and medivac transport. Air 5 was the only airborne law enforcement helicopter with advanced life support capability and multi-patient capacity on scene in the impacted area. As the search and rescue/recovery phase subsided, many of the military and governmental helicopters in-area were demobilized, including LASD’s Air 5.

California OES, Law Enforcement representative Deputy Chief Robert Gerber, remained on scene at the LSP state operations as the agency/state mutual aid liaison to LSP and Governor Blanco’s office. Chief Gerber provided emergency management guidance and mutual aid coordination to the command personnel of the LSP. He also worked closely with the CHP and LASD to ensure proper mutual aid protocols and accommodations were implemented. Chief Gerber was relieved by Assistant Chief Dennis Beene who maintained a liaison presence in the state operations center until being demobilized on September 14.

California law enforcement inter-state mutual aid to Louisiana concluded on Thursday, September 29, 2005, when the second phase of CHP officers returned to Southern California. Subsequently, there were no additional requests for law enforcement mutual aid from California. As the water receded and utilities and lifelines came back online, requests for assistance subsided to a level whereby adjacent states could meet the on-going needs of the Louisiana State and local agencies.



**Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s “Air Rescue 5” helicopter and crew on-scene in New Orleans. LA.**

The California Military Department (CMD), among other assigned disaster response missions, supported the OES and interstate law enforcement mutual aid deployment to the state of Louisiana by transporting a contingent of CHP officers to Baton Rouge, LA to relieve the initial deployment of over 100 officers. The Air National Guard C-130 transport aircraft completed its round trip from Northern California by returning the “first in” CHP officers. Table 3 below provides some statistics on the CMD’s Hurricane Katrina response and recovery activities.

**Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed General Order 2005-01 ordering The Adjutant General, State of California, to call into active state service the forces necessary to support Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.**

- ✪ **Approximate Troops Days Expended: 54,428**
- ✪ **Total Missions: 63**
- ✪ **Total Sorties: 209**
- ✪ **Total Flying Hours: 587**
- ✪ **Total Cargo Airlifted: 690,000 pounds**
- ✪ **Total Vehicles Airlifted: 28**



**Note: Totals include the Air National Guard assistance from other states that helped move California equipment and personnel.**

**TABLE 3**



California Highway Patrol officers prepare to load a CA Air National Guard C-130 aircraft enroute to an interstate law enforcement mutual aid mission in Louisiana.

## NOTEWORTHY ISSUES & LESSONS LEARNED

The response to a disaster of this magnitude and duration is replete with inadequacies, failed policies, practices, procedures, and poor or faulty judgment. This is not a new problem. Past crises have had their own difficulties and challenges. Hurricane Katrina provides an excellent opportunity to study the response by the various disciplines at all governmental levels including the private sector, examine the deficiencies, and incorporate the lessons learned into our own departmental plans and operations. As mentioned earlier in this document, much has already been written regarding the lessons learned in the response to Hurricane Katrina. The following noteworthy issues and lessons learned are confined to the observations and experiences of the OES Law Enforcement Branch representatives who were deployed to Louisiana under the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact early in September.

### **ISSUE #1. Inter-state Law Enforcement Mutual Aid**

Again, the deploying of law enforcement mutual aid out-of-state was an inaugural event for the State of California. Mutual aid was provided under the authority of the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact since California was not yet a member of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.

The requests for law enforcement mutual aid for deployment in Louisiana came from multiple agencies and locations. The Louisiana State Police, the Louisiana State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Louisiana State University, the National Sheriff's Association (Washington D.C.), Critical Intervention Services (a Clearwater, FL security and consulting firm), and the federal Department of Homeland Security were among the organizations from which OES received requests for law enforcement mutual aid. In addition, many law enforcement agencies throughout California received the mutual aid requests from Louisiana and were curious to the legitimacy of the call for assistance and how they might be able to respond.

The multiple requests received from several entities and locations was unexpected and indicative of the lack of adequate personnel and resource coordination within Louisiana. It was important to determine the authority of the request, the requirements and details of the requests, and the eligibility for federal reimbursement. Because there was no single point of contact within the State of Louisiana for law enforcement mutual aid, it became necessary for the OES Law Enforcement Branch representative, on the advance team, to formally institute with Louisiana state officials once in Baton Rouge. Subsequently, as provided in Governor Blanco's letter of request to Governor Schwarzenegger, the LSP was designated as the point of contact for requesting law enforcement mutual aid.



Despite the best effort of the LSP to integrate their official request out-of-state mutual aid with their own officers, there were other in-state organizations requesting law enforcement mutual aid. For example, the “Louisiana Sheriff’s Task Force” to request and coordinate law enforcement mutual aid. Following processing and approval through the state’s EMAC program, the mutual aid “...[would] be assigned for deployment, tracking, operational assignment, and the demobilization to be handled in entirety by the Louisiana Sheriff’s Task Force.”<sup>4</sup>

Another example of multiple source mutual aid ordering was the requesting of “flat bottom boats” by the Louisiana State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.



It should be noted that the OES Law Enforcement Branch responded to a nation-wide request from the State of Louisiana, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries for “flat boats” to be used for search and rescue/recovery in the New Orleans area. Several state agencies and local Sheriff’s departments throughout California identified their own capability to meet this call and were ready to deploy upon an official request from the

Louisiana State agency and OES. However, there were unnecessary delays by the Louisiana State agency and their in-state resource ordering system. Consequently, the “on-stand-by” boats and crews were stood down due primarily to closer resources and the diminishing requirement for this type of watercraft.

## **ISSUE #2. Mutual Aid Resource Coordination**



Out-of-state mutual aid forces, regardless of the type of public safety organization, were not adequately accounted for and managed. Request for law enforcement mutual aid came from disparate sources. Many agencies self-deployed to New Orleans without official request and added to the overwhelming burden placed on responsible jurisdictions to manage and coordinate on-scene personnel and resources.

Furthermore, mission tasking became problematic due to the multitude and variety of response agencies and the lack of proper, disciplined, check-in and debriefing procedures.

The Louisiana State Police was more successful in mutual aid resource management because other state police organizations, responding to the official request of the LSP, first checked in with the LSP at their Baton Rouge headquarters were formally briefed and provided mission assignments. However, the LSP provided law enforcement support to the impacted local police departments and, therefore, had to deal with the multitude and mix of law enforcement agencies on-scene who were either self-deployed or there at the request of a local agency. As mission assignments from the LSP to some out-of-state agencies diminished, the agency went to other local law enforcement agencies for potential missions, thus making resource management even more difficult.

<sup>4</sup>Source: Louisiana Sheriff’s Task Force.

Essentially, there existed no formal law enforcement resource management system or functional mutual aid system in Louisiana resulting in the ineffective use and application of many law enforcement mutual aid forces.

**COMMENT:** California has had in place for over 40 years a formal law enforcement mutual aid system. In recent years, the law enforcement mutual aid system has incorporated the “Incident Command System” which eventually became a component to the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). The mutual aid system provides a protocol for requesting and receiving mutual aid and for comprehensive personnel and resource management. The proper and disciplined adherence to the mutual aid system by California’s law enforcement agencies significantly contributes to more effective response results and thus should not produce many of the problems experienced in Louisiana.

### **ISSUE # 3. Command & Control**

The Louisiana Military Department (National Guard) is the lead emergency management agency during disasters. The State Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Office of Homeland Security are part of the organizational structure of the Military Department. Although the Military Department was not federalized it poses the question of effective command and control operations should the National Guard personnel be brought under U.S. Title 10 federal authority and control.

**COMMENT:** While California’s State Military Department is a separate organization apart from the Office of Emergency Services, it is important to consider the consequences of federal activation under various disaster scenarios to determine personnel/resource availability and mission capability.

### **ISSUE #4. Posse Comitatus Act**



The large presence of military units in the impacted area and the various missions they performed generated a national dialogue regarding the expanded use of federal military troops in domestic disasters and civil unrest situations. The Stafford Act authorizes the use of the military for disaster relief operations at the request of the state governor, but does not authorize the use of the military to perform law enforcement functions, which is ordinarily prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act. This Act prohibits active-duty federal troops from enforcing the law domestically, though governors can summon National Guard troops for that purpose, and the President can temporarily override the prohibition by invoking the Insurrection Act. The Posse Comitatus Act did not apply to the California National Guard troops deployed to the Gulf

Coast because they were directed by Governor Schwarzenegger to provide assistance and remained in a “state status” while performing their military support to civil authorities during the disaster.

There were several occasions in the City of New Orleans area where law enforcement personnel, including CHP, were aggressively challenged by federal military troops for identification, mission purpose, and authority when performing missions assigned to

them by the State Police or local law enforcement agency. There were many overly redundant missions performed by the military and public safety agencies. While the presence of the military helped to provide calm and security to a chaotic and desperate situation, the magnitude of the number of active duty military troops on-scene impeded the ability of state and local emergency managers to more effectively and efficiently carry out their response coordination.

**COMMENT:** The 1992 civil unrest in Los Angeles demonstrated the complexities and difficulties of placing the State Military Department under federal command and control. The California Military Department is an integral element of the State's response to a myriad of disasters and provides significant logistical support among other essential support missions to OES and other state agencies. However, its role in performing traditional law enforcement functions is a "last resort" type of mission and restraint should be demonstrated in the use of military troops in place of, or in advance of, the existing protocols and capabilities of the law enforcement mutual aid system.

### ISSUE #5. Search and Rescue Operations



Search and rescue (SAR) operations in Louisiana and Mississippi were aided significantly from the onset of the flooding by the CA/FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) swift water rescue teams, including 8 from California. This "fire service discipline" response aside, the traditional role of searching for and rescuing lost and or injured victims in times of emergency resides with local law enforcement agencies. In Louisiana, unlike California, the State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) has official responsibility to assist overwhelmed local governments by providing SAR coordination of mutual aid response personnel and resources. According to their plan, the LDWF has primary responsibility to "to provide assistance in all activities associated with Search and Rescue (SAR) operations which are beyond the capabilities of the local governments within the affected areas; to coordinate the integration of personnel and equipment resources." This responsibility includes water-borne SAR. Multi-agency coordination of the SAR function was difficult if not non-existent.

As was witnessed "live" by the world on the cable news networks, search and rescue operations in and around the City of New Orleans were performed by air, land, and water by a multitude of agencies and disciplines, to include a large number of military helicopters and high-clearance vehicles. Many residents who remained in their homes were forced to their attics and roof tops by the rising water. SAR missions were being conducted relying on 911 calls for help, boat patrols, and visual reconnaissance by rotary-wing aircraft. Rescues were being performed several days after the levee broke and floodwaters inundated New Orleans.



Early in the search and rescue period of the disaster, the Louisiana State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries made a nation-wide request for "flat boats" for SAR deployment in New Orleans. In response to this call for assistance, the OES Law Enforcement Branch, as the state point of contact for interstate requests for SAR mutual aid, asked

California state agencies and local Sheriff's Departments for response availability and capability. Subsequently, several departments responded to the OES solicitation for flat boats and were standing by for further instructions for possible deployment.



Unfortunately, the Louisiana State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries request became mired and lost in the EMAC process and paperwork. In fact, there was debate in Louisiana over the eligibility or participation of California due to explicit wording on the EMAC request form to exclude California. Subsequently, after four days of waiting by CA OES and the many agencies on standby for more formal acknowledgement, official request, and deployment details, the request for flat boats was rescinded. Incidentally, by the time the on-scene OES Deputy Chief Gerber pressed the LDWF for resolution of the request, the urgency for water-borne search and rescue resources diminished significantly.

**COMMENT:** The LDWF simply took too long after its initial nationwide call for help to make and send an official request to CA OES. After 4 days of standing by and with a travel time to New Orleans of 3 days, it was unrealistic to expect an effective and efficient SAR response to a disaster scene where the need for water craft was decreasing.



In recent years, pre-deployment of FEMA's Urban Search & Rescue swift water teams ahead of hurricanes, rising flood waters and other incidents requiring this type of first responder resource, proved prudent and effective. However, where on-scene search and rescue operations and incident management problems have occurred, law enforcement and other government agencies, who have jurisdictional authority and responsibility in the impacted area, are faced with the task of SAR multi-agency coordination. In major disasters SAR command and control can be difficult with multitude and variety of local, state, out-of-state, and federal resources deployed.

## **ISSUE #6. Documentation & Resource Management**

A key component of the Incident Command System (ICS) is "comprehensive resource management." In multi-agency, multi-governmental response to disasters it is essential that disciplined procedures are in place to manage/track personnel, resources, and expenses. In overwhelming disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, it becomes extremely difficult to account for and manage/coordinate the multitude of resources that arrive on scene either by request or voluntarily. Agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities for disaster response and emergency management should adhere to strict procedures in managing the personnel and resources.

Federal, state, and local agencies in Louisiana had difficulty in being able to provide accurate information as to the personnel and resources under their authority and command. The influx of mutual aid personnel, in addition to volunteers and "well meaning self-dispatched public safety personnel", into the New Orleans area compounded the problem of achieving adequate comprehensive resource management. With no reliable information as to how many law enforcement officers were deployed and their locations, it made the task of determining the need for additional law enforcement mutual aid challenging. In fact, the LSP, after receiving such a positive

response for their national call for mutual aid and recognizing the amount of law enforcement personnel in the state versus the diminishing field mission assignments, issued a nation-wide broadcast asking for agencies *not* to send any more personnel until further notice.

The devastation of Hurricane Katrina affected the ability of Louisiana state and local law enforcement agencies and other public safety entities to sufficiently deploy their personnel and equipment. Many law enforcement officers were personally affected by the disaster losing their homes, destroying their response gear and uniforms, and, more tragically, losing family members. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) personnel suffered significant personnel losses, in addition to losing vehicles and equipment to flood damage. Several officers went absent without leave (AWOL) for various reasons therefore contributing to the understaffed posture of the department. These types of situation made for further unpredictability in managing resources and identifying agency personnel capacity and capability.

The LSP was one of many Louisiana governmental agencies receiving, deploying, and managing incoming mutual aid personnel and resources. Mutual aid resources were provided fuel for vehicles, and other items without inventory/cost tracking methods in place. There was no resource management tool, such as the “T-card system” utilized to track the status of disaster responders and resources.

**COMMENT:** Upon arrival and initial briefing at the Louisiana State Police headquarters in Baton Rouge, it became apparent to Deputy Chief Gerber that there was no coordinated disaster response plan in place and that the multitude of response personnel and resources could not be adequately accounted for, or at least identified in any general, quantifiable terms. Furthermore, the Louisiana State Operations Center, along with the various federal emergency support functions (ESFs) did not have an overall grasp of the “who, what, where, and when” of personnel and resources from out of state. If there were any emergency management and mutual aid systems in Louisiana, they were overwhelmed to the point of not being able to employ an effective resource management system(s).

Record keeping and other accountability functions of response personnel and resources were sporadic and inconsistent. This not only made it difficult for resource management, but will prove problematic or even indefensible when future audits are conducted to determine government reimbursements for disaster related personnel and resource expenditures. Additionally, the lack of accurate accounts of personnel, resources, phone/email/dispatch logs, and other activities may be detrimental to completing after action reports and answering to legal and legislative inquiries.

California has proven mutual aid systems in place and has experienced disasters that have taxed these systems. The Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) has brought some much needed organization to help manage disasters. A catastrophic disaster the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina in California will undoubtedly put extreme demands on the SEMS and will require disciplined adherence to these proven systems. However, it must be flexible enough to meet the unusual circumstances or consequences of major calamities such as near location Tsunamis, magnitude 8.3 urban earthquakes, and exotic weapons of mass destruction type of terrorism events.

## ISSUE #7. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)



The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) was established in 1996. Since being ratified by Congress and signed into law, in 1996, (Public Law 104-321), 49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become members of EMAC. EMAC is the first national disaster-relief compact since the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of 1950 to be ratified by Congress. The EMAC compact is an agreement among member states that outlines the legal agreements and procedures for providing assistance to other member states in the event of an emergency or disaster. Under the compact, it is the responsibility of states requesting assistance to pay back the states that provide it. EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). See Appendix C for more information on EMAC.

The State of California, through legislation, became a member on September 13, 2005, over one week after the flooding in New Orleans. Up to the time when California became an EMAC member, there were no formal EMAC requests made to California. In fact, the out of state requests for personnel and resources on EMAC forms specifically excluded California from participating. Therefore, it was necessary to invoke the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact in order to formally provide law enforcement mutual aid to Louisiana. Many various California public safety and emergency services resources were anxious and ready to respond to Louisiana and Mississippi but early requests never materialized due primarily to the bureaucratic prohibition in the EMAC process due to California's not being a member. .

**COMMENT:** It should be noted that as of September 2, 2005, California was not a member of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA, see Attachment C for more information on EMAC). While only one of two states not participating in the EMAC system, California would employ the "Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact" (see Attachment B) as the official means of providing mutual aid to the State of Louisiana. This compact also provides for responding California departments to retain their peace officer status while maintaining their workman's compensation and other job related benefits.

It is advisable that the National Emergency Management Association conduct an "after-action", "lessons learned" of the EMAC system performance in response to Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, it is recommended that NEMA meet with appropriate California agency officials to obtain comments on EMAC issues pertaining to Hurricane Katrina and future interstate mutual aid requests.

## ISSUE # 8. Communications

“Thirty-eight 9-1-1 call centers went down. Local wireless networks also sustained considerable damage with more than one thousand cell sites out of service. Over 20 million telephone calls did not go through the day after the hurricane<sup>3</sup>.”



Effective command and control disaster response operations require reliable and sustainable communications. Unfortunately, the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina disabled two critical elements of infrastructure: electrical power and communications. It was quite evident that first responders were handicapped in performing their life saving missions and regular public safety duties. Out-of-state mutual aid had to be creative and employed “work-around” solutions in order to communicate. The CHP utilized their departmental issue national NEXTEL phones with push-to-talk radio features to communicate with one another and the LSP. Cell phone reliability within the New Orleans area was adequate but often times it was difficult to receive out of state calls. Many of the out-of-state mutual aid agencies brought their own mobile communications vehicles and parochial radio systems which were incompatible with the myriad of other agencies on scene.

"We didn't have an interoperability problem, we had an operability problem," stated a Commander of the Louisiana State Police. "We couldn't communicate within our own department much less with other departments. We had a lot of responders coming in to help, but our system didn't have the capacity to operate with all these new users."

**COMMENT:** Regardless of the infrastructure failures, fail-safe communications is paramount to emergency and disaster response. A well prepared community should have redundant or back-up communications systems for when the need arises. Preparing for Y2K provided the opportunity to assess communications vulnerabilities and establish work-around solutions and or “quick fixes” to maintain adequate departmental communications. However, while individual departments at all levels of government work to improve their own abilities to communicate, the debate rages on about regional and national communications interoperability.

In consideration of future out-of-state deployments, OES should consider developing radio caches with portable repeaters in mobile kit form. At a minimum, this would allow for hand held communications between team members. Prior or emergency authorization by the Federal Communications Commission may be needed to allow for radio frequency allocation and usage in impacted state.

In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives: “Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet (Committee on Energy and Commerce), Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman, Kevin J. Martin stated:

“First responders need an interoperable, mobile wireless communications system that can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the country. Such a system must have two essential features. First, the system must be interoperable – it must allow different organizations

from different jurisdictions to communicate with each other immediately, through both voice and data transmissions. This requires that there be sufficient spectrum devoted to these purposes. Equally importantly, it requires that first responders have equipment capable of operating on multiple frequencies in multiple formats, so that different systems can connect with each other. So-called ‘smart radios’ are ideally suited to this purpose, as they can intelligently jump to different frequencies and formats as needed to establish communications. Properly implemented, a system with adequate spectrum and smart radios would help to ensure that both data and voice are transmitted between agencies instantly, replacing multiple, lengthy phone calls to multiple agencies.

Second, the system must be capable of rapid deployment and/or restoration. This requires the use of multiple, flexible technologies and truly mobile infrastructure. If we learned anything from Hurricane Katrina, it is that we cannot rely solely on terrestrial communications. When radio towers are knocked down, satellite communications are, in some instances, the most effective means of communicating. At the same time, we should use new technologies so that first responders can take advantage of whatever terrestrial network is available. Smart radios would enable first responders to find any available towers or infrastructure on multiple frequencies, and Wi-Fi, spread spectrum and other frequency hopping techniques would enable them to use limited spectrum quickly and efficiently. Additionally, mobile antennas – capable of using both satellite and terrestrial technology – should be used to establish communications as quickly as possible. This infrastructure could include inflatable antennas, cell towers on wheels, high-altitude balloons, or other mobile facilities. A system taking advantage of such measures would be capable of truly rapid deployment.”

#### **ISSUE #9. Officer personal, family, and department preparedness**



The personal lives of public safety first responders are not immune from the affects of disasters. In wide spread catastrophes many first responders and other critical services personnel suffer personal and property losses. Hurricane Katrina’s path of destruction had a significant detrimental affect on several law enforcement, fire service, and other emergency services organization personnel.

Family members were killed or injured, homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable, governmental offices were flooded along with personal equipment and supplies. Many first responders and their families became homeless; many did not show up for work. The overwhelming affects of the hurricane on its employees made it difficult for public safety agencies to perform their necessary functions.


As an added task to an already overwhelmed department, several public safety agencies scrambled to “take care of their own.” The LSP housed several of their personnel and their family members at the LSP academy and training facility in Baton Rouge. Other departments made arrangements with their unaffected personnel to host dislodged co-workers and their families. Other employees were required to make their own arrangements to bring some safety and stability to their lives. Those homeless personnel that did show up to work lacked adequate uniforms and equipment. Departmental issue identification and duty weapons were lost or rendered unusable due to the flooding. Again, many departments were faced with issues not planned for or considered.

**COMMENT:** The far-reaching impacts of Hurricane Katrina brutally exposed an issue that has been given too little consideration and emphasis i.e., public safety officer personal and family preparedness. It is no exaggeration to state that public safety agencies across the nation have not taken the necessary measures to ensure that their employees are personally prepared, along with their families, for all types of

emergencies. Furthermore, public safety agencies may not have considered the impacts of absenteeism by significant percentages of staff due to personal reasons brought on by disaster.

Public safety and emergency services agencies should make the personal preparedness of their employees an important priority. Moreover, departments should have plans in place to meet the extraordinary demands that catastrophic disasters will place on affected agencies and their employees.

## ISSUE #10. Hazardous First Responder Environment



The destructive impact of Hurricane Katrina created an environmental and health emergency of its own. Early in the aftermath of the hurricane there was a tragically insufficient supply of water, food, shelter, and sanitation resources for the victims and first responders. The potential for communicable disease outbreaks due to

contaminated food and water supplies was significant and of great concern to local, state and federal health agencies. In addition, the widespread flooding impacted resident chemical plants, oil refineries, and other businesses that utilized various hazardous chemicals. The result was a “toxic soup” that became the lethal environment in which the first responders carried out their critical life-safety missions.

For many local first responders, performing their life-saving duties and responsibilities took priority over the need to adequately protect themselves from the hazardous on-scene environment. Many law enforcement personnel in the impacted area simply did not have personal protective equipment (PPE) and clothing due to various reasons including not being issued by department or inaccessible and damaged PPE due to flooding. More literally, many public safety departments simply did not consider this type of scenario and properly outfit their personnel with adequate PPE. Regardless of the reasons, the floodwaters, debris, and buildings presented major life-threatening issues for first responders.



The Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published on their web site several bulletins and guidance documents. Required immunizations, recommended PPE, mental health, chemical exposure information, and mold precautions were among the many documents prepared by the CDC for Hurricane Katrina victims and response personnel. Unfortunately, many of

the out of state mutual aid responders were not aware of the CDC guidelines and were not adequately briefed on the response environment and the recommended PPE to bring. The Louisiana State Police did provide some PPE and made arrangements for nurses to administer recommended immunizations.

Unlike the typical life cycle of a disaster, the disaster environment did not significantly improve with time. Prolonged flooding caused toxic mold to build up in homes, businesses, and other buildings. Tons of debris, garbage, and other potentially hazardous

material littered the city of New Orleans and vicinity making conditions hazardous many days after the hurricane and initial flood waters. Law enforcement deployed in these areas performed house to house searches, provided security patrols in evacuated areas, and assisted local police agencies in calls for service.

**COMMENT:** Disaster response environments can present challenges especially where there is widespread destruction as caused by Hurricane Katrina. Law enforcement agencies that have not considered the possible scenarios their officers may be faced with, and the required PPE, may be hampered in their ability to perform their law enforcement duties and responsibilities. Also, while public safety agencies are concerned with immunizations for blood borne pathogens, it is also prudent to consider maintaining personnel immunizations on tetanus and other medical precautions.

### **ISSUE #11. Emergency Evacuation**

“Louisiana also lacked an adequate plan to evacuate New Orleans, despite years of research that predicted a disaster equal to or worse than Katrina. Even after a disaster test run last year exposed weaknesses in evacuation and recovery, officials failed to come up with solutions.”

Dara Kam, Palm Beach Post, 10 September 2005



Gulf coast states have a long history of experiencing hurricanes that necessitate evacuations. In more recent times, the State of Florida has conducted successful evacuations due to incoming major hurricanes. In contrast, Louisiana residents in the projected pathway of Hurricane Katrina had ample warning, and mandatory evacuation orders to evacuate, but thousands of people remained behind in the City of New Orleans and vicinity.

There were many critical issues surrounding the evacuation and stay-behind population in the New Orleans regional area. These issues include:

- Evacuation needs of persons without personal vehicles.
- Evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes, group homes, etc.
- Evacuation of homeless
- Evacuation of stranded tourists
- Providing for people who can't self-evacuate
- Availability and reliability of public/private transportation
- Alert/notification methods and procedures
- Animal/pet evacuations
- Fuel/road mechanic availability
- Identification of shelters and other type of temporary housing
- Primary and alternate evacuation route designation

After Hurricane Katrina, The New York Times reviewed the evacuation plans for some of the nation's largest cities and reported September 24, 2005: "From Los Angeles to Boston, from Seattle to Miami, plans to relocate, house and feed potentially hundreds of thousands of displaced people are embryonic at best and non-existent at worst." There was a clarion call from all political, governmental, and civilian spectrums for local and state governments to develop/revise current evacuation plans with consideration to the problems encountered in Louisiana and with the subsequent Hurricane Rita.

**COMMENT:** It is prudent to examine the lessons learned from the evacuations in Louisiana and other states following Hurricane Katrina and Rita. CA OES was asked by the OES Director to conduct a series of workshops with state and local emergency management officials to develop mass evacuation guidelines. Several other local jurisdictions in California have initiated review and revisions of their respective evacuation plans.

### **ISSUE #12 Animal/Pet Evacuations and Care**



Hurricane Katrina generated the largest animal rescue in the history of the United States<sup>4</sup>. Over 4,000 pets were rescued. FEMA search and rescue teams, military personnel, and public safety agencies rescued stranded victims and their pets. The emergency evacuation and shelter of animals from cats to horses has emerged as an added responsibility to governmental agencies. Fortunately, there are numerous professional volunteer organizations that have organized within the last ten years to assist local and state governments in animal care during and following a disaster. However, in many instances where animal rescue volunteer and civic organizations have not been established, this mission often times requires extensive effort by law enforcement and fire service first responders.

**COMMENT:** The rescue and shelter of animals during emergencies can tax the personnel, resource capability, and life-saving responsibilities of law enforcement departments and other public safety organizations. There were reports during the response to Hurricane Katrina that helicopter pilots and rescue boat captains refused to load pets in order to hold more people. Also, many families and individuals in affected areas refused to evacuate without their pets. The emotional bond between owner and pet can not be underestimated. However, these types of issues, if not addressed, impede public safety professionals from being more effective and efficient in their "life-saving" duties.

The establishment of animal shelters and veterinarian services demands the time and attention of local and state emergency services professionals. Animal rescue and sheltering should be an integral element of disaster response plans. There are several volunteer and government sponsored organizations that fulfill these animal rescue roles therefore lessening the demand on public safety first responders. Local animal rescue centers, humane societies, FEMA, and the American Veterinary Medical Association's Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (VMAT) are among many organizations that can be incorporated into governmental disaster plans.

## ISSUE #13 Worst Case Scenario Preparedness, Planning, and Exercises

“...this disaster combined loss of life with destruction of physical assets, you saw a sort of cascading failure of all the infrastructure systems that our agencies rely upon to conduct their operations. You lost the transportation system—roads and bridges, railroads, waterways. You lost the electricity and oil and gas systems; loss of communications systems, both wireless and wired; loss of sanitation systems; the food and water systems that people need to survive. All of that wiped out by Katrina and ... what’s clear is that not only affected the people living there; it affected the responders; and that our response assets were insufficiently prepared to deal with a situation in which all of the infrastructure that’s normally there in a disaster is gone.”

Richard A. Falkenrath  
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies  
Brookings Institution

In less than 12 months, the world witnessed two catastrophes that could be described as “worst case” types of disasters. First the deadly and ruinous tsunami in the Indian Ocean, and then Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast. Despite the fact that these two calamities were on the “radar screen” for preparedness and response planning, very little was accomplished in their respective countries to mitigate the potential affects of such large magnitude disasters. Certainly, states along the Gulf Coast prepare, plan, and respond to hurricanes annually during “hurricane season.” However, as witnessed in Louisiana, the preparations and plans to cope with a major hurricane were woefully inadequate. Even as overwhelming as the hurricane and ensuing flood were, emergency management and response activities such as evacuations, sheltering, and security should have offered more to an extremely needy population. What response plans that were in place prior to Hurricane Katrina were not followed, not known, and/or may not have exercised prior to the event.

United States Vice Admiral Thad Allen, principal federal official for the Gulf Coast recovery from Hurricane Katrina stated:

"I don't think the national response plan anticipated how we would react to what I'd call a catastrophic loss of the elements of a civil society," Allen says. "New Orleans was taken down hard. This is far beyond the scale for what might have been envisioned for a natural disaster response and comes closer to what you might envision if a weapon of mass effect was used on a municipality. From that standpoint the lessons learned from this will be extremely useful."

**COMMENT:** Hindsight provides us with ample opportunity to criticize the many failures and inadequacies of Louisiana and the federal government’s preparedness and response activities. It is not uncommon for government to discount worst case types of disasters. Natural and manmade disasters that have low percentages of happening receive little attention, especially if they have never occurred. Most disaster planning and preparedness emphasis is placed on incidents that happen on a more frequent basis and have more acceptable cost versus benefit results. Furthermore, the more time that has passed since the last major disaster the more apathy develops among government and legislative leaders toward disaster preparedness and response. Finally, it is imperative that an “all-hazards” approach to disaster planning and preparedness be maintained despite the current emphasis on terrorism prevention and response.

The Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina present strong arguments for greater emphasis on planning, preparing and mitigating the affects of “worst case” types of disasters that may occur in California and across the nation. In addition, we should engage in more table-top and functional field exercises to condition our first responders and emergency management personnel, and to expose and correct the deficiencies in our plans.

“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” (a little precaution before a crisis occurs is preferable to a lot of fixing up afterward) is an old but worthy adage that can be attributed not only to Hurricane Katrina but to all disaster planning. Costs attributed to Hurricane Katrina continue to mount. Unfortunately a significant portion of the expense could have been avoided by proper planning, mitigation and response. Disaster planning, response, and exercises must be given the proper funding priority by local, state, and federal governmental organizations.

| <b>SOURCES: NOAA, FEMA, LAGIC, LDHH, LDOL, LDED, &amp; ISO</b> | <b>HURRICANE KATRINA<br/>AUGUST 23-31, 2005</b>                                         | <b>HURRICANE RITA<br/>SEPTEMBER 2-31, 2005</b>                                          |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>US STATES IMPACTED</b>                                      | Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee                                 | Louisiana, Texas                                                                        |
| <b>STRENGTH (AT LANDFALL)</b>                                  | Category 4                                                                              | Category 3                                                                              |
| <b>MINIMUM BAROMETRIC PRESSURE</b>                             | 902mb (32mile wide eye)                                                                 | 897mb                                                                                   |
| <b>WINDS (AT LANDFALL)</b>                                     | 140+ mph                                                                                | 120+ mph                                                                                |
| <b>RAINFALL</b>                                                | 12in – 16in                                                                             | 6in – 12in                                                                              |
| <b>STORM SURGE</b>                                             | 4 – 32 feet<br>30'+ in Biloxi, MS; 20'+ in Plaquemines, LA                              | 4 – 16 feet<br>15'+ Strom Surge                                                         |
| <b>AREA IMPACTED</b>                                           | Total: 108,456 sq. miles                                                                | Total: 85,729 sq. miles                                                                 |
| <b>CASUALTIES (AS OF 12/16/05)</b>                             | Total: 1,321<br>Louisiana: 1,095                                                        | Total: 119<br>Louisiana: 0                                                              |
| <b>PEOPLE IMPACTED</b>                                         | 2,500,000 households request Individual Assistance                                      | 460,000 households request Individual Assistance                                        |
| <b>LEFT HOMELESS</b>                                           | Total: 527,000<br>Louisiana: 288,700                                                    | Total: 76,500<br>Louisiana: 76,500                                                      |
| <b>BUSINESSES IMPACTED</b>                                     | 71,000+ in Louisiana                                                                    | 45,000+ in Louisiana                                                                    |
| <b>JOB LOSSES</b>                                              | 400,000+ in Louisiana                                                                   | 45,000+ in Louisiana                                                                    |
| <b>DAMAGE ESTIMATED</b>                                        | \$34.4 Billion Total; \$22 Billion in Louisiana (Source: ISO Properties report 10/7/05) | \$4.7 Billion Total; \$2.4 Billion in Louisiana (Source: ISO Properties Report 10/7/05) |

**Source: 2005 Louisiana Hurricane Impact Atlas  
Volume 1, Joshua D. Kent, Data Manager**

# APPENDICES

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# APPENDIX A



# Department of Public Safety and Corrections

*Public Safety Services*

KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO  
GOVERNOR

September 3, 2005

HENRY L. WHITEHORN, COLONEL  
DEPUTY SECRETARY, PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES  
SUPERINTENDENT, OFFICE OF STATE POLICE

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger  
State Capitol Building  
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Governor Schwarzenegger:

The impact of Hurricane Katrina has taxed our public safety personnel and resources. The aftermath of this catastrophe has placed extraordinary demands on local and state law enforcement organizations. Therefore, in accordance to, and adherence with, the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact, I hereby respectfully request law enforcement mutual aid assistance from the State of California, to include the following:

1. California Highway Patrol  
3 Rotary-Wing Aircraft and Crew  
100 Uniformed Personnel and appropriate number of patrol vehicles
2. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department  
1 Rotary-Wing Aircraft (H-3) and Crew

I understand that the mutual aid logistics, peace officer powers, and assigned disaster deployment mission(s) will be subject to our mutual agreement prior to on-scene deployment.

Due to the magnitude of this disaster it is unknown, at this time, neither how long these requested resources will be necessary nor if additional personnel and equipment will be required.

I have authorized my Superintendent of the Louisiana Office of State Police, Colonel Henry Whitehorn, to act as the point of contact and coordination for Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual Aid requests.

I am truly grateful for your cooperation and assistance during our time of need, I look forward to your prompt reply to my request.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco  
Governor  
State of Louisiana



*Department of Transportation and Public Safety Services*  
*Public Safety Services*

KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO  
GOVERNOR

September 1, 2005  
0800/2205/MSO  
HQ-01-1090

HENRY L. WHITEHORN, COLONEL  
DEPUTY SECRETARY, PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES  
SUPERINTENDENT, OFFICE OF STATE POLICE

Commissioner Mike Brown  
California Highway Patrol  
2555 1<sup>st</sup> Ave  
Sacramento, California 95818

Dear Commissioner Mike Brown:

As you are aware, the city of New Orleans, Louisiana has suffered massive damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. We are currently utilizing all State assets to stabilize the situation; however, looting continues to be a significant problem. As the head of Louisiana State Police, I am requesting any assistance you can provide to this agency to assist with this issue to include deployment of available tactical teams.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Henry L. Whitehorn, Colonel  
Superintendent, Office of State Police

# **APPENDIX B**

# Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact

## GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 177-178.5

177. The Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact as set forth in Section 178 executed between the State of California, through its then Governor, Earl Warren, on December 10, 1951, and other states which are parties to the compact, is hereby ratified and approved.

178. The provisions of the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact between the State of California and other states which are parties to the compact referred to in Section 177 are as follows:

The State of California, through its Governor, duly authorized, solemnly agrees with any other state or territory of the United States which is or may become a party to this compact, as follows:

Article 1. The purpose of this compact is to provide mutual aid among the states in meeting any emergency or disaster from enemy attack or other cause (natural or otherwise) including sabotage and subversive acts and direct attacks by bombs, shellfire, and atomic, radiological, chemical, bacteriological means, and other weapons. The prompt, full and effective utilization of the resources of the respective states, including such resources as may be available from the United States Government or any other source, are essential to the safety, care and welfare of the people thereof in the event of enemy action or other emergency, and any other resources, including personnel, equipment or supplies, shall be incorporated into a plan or plans of mutual aid to be developed among the civil defense agencies or similar bodies of the states that are parties hereto. The directors of civil defense of all party states shall constitute a committee to formulate plans and take all necessary steps for the implementation of this compact.

Article 2. It shall be the duty of each party state to formulate civil defense plans and programs for application within such state. There shall be frequent consultation between the representatives of the states and with the United States Government and the free exchange of information and plans, including inventories of any materials and equipment available for civil defense. In carrying out such civil defense plans and programs the party states shall so far as possible provide and follow uniform standards, practices and rules and regulations including:

- (a) Insignia, arm bands and any other distinctive articles to designate and distinguish the different civil defense services;
- (b) Blackouts and practice blackouts, air raid drills, mobilization of civil defense forces and other tests and exercises;
- (c) Warnings and signals for drills or attacks and the mechanical devices to be used in connection therewith;
- (d) The effective screening or extinguishing of all lights and lighting devices and appliances;
- (e) Shutting off water mains, gas mains, electric power connections and the suspension of all other utility services;

(f) All materials or equipment used or to be used for civil defense purposes in order to assure that such materials and equipment will be easily and freely interchangeable when used in or by any other party state;

(g) The conduct of civilians and the movement and cessation of movement of pedestrians and vehicular traffic, prior, during, and subsequent to drills or attacks;

(h) The safety of public meetings or gatherings; and

(i) Mobile support units.

Article 3. Any party state requested to render mutual aid shall take such action as is necessary to provide and make available the resources covered by this compact in accordance with the terms hereof; provided that it is understood that the state rendering aid may withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection for such state. Each party state shall extend to the civil defense forces of any other party state, while operating within its state limits under the terms and conditions of this compact, the same powers (except that of arrest unless specifically authorized by the receiving state), duties, rights, privileges and immunities as if they were performing their duties in the state in which normally employed or rendering services. Civil defense forces will continue under the command and control of their regular leaders but the organizational units will come under the operational control of the civil defense authorities of the state receiving assistance.

Article 4. Whenever any person holds a license, certificate or other permit issued by any state evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical or other skills, such person may render aid involving such skill in any party state to meet an emergency or disaster and such state shall give due recognition to such license, certificate or other permit as if issued in the state in which aid is rendered.

Article 5. No party state or its officers or employees rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so engaged, or on account of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith.

Article 6. Inasmuch as it is probable that the pattern and detail of the machinery for mutual aid among two or more states may differ from that appropriate among other states party hereto, this instrument contains elements of a broad base common to all states, and nothing herein contained shall preclude any state from entering into supplementary agreements with another state or states. Such supplementary agreements may comprehend, but shall not be limited to, provisions for evacuation and reception of injured and other persons, and the exchange of medical, fire, police, public utility, reconnaissance, welfare, transportation and communications personnel, equipment and supplies.

Article 7. Each party state shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the civil defense forces of that state and the representatives of deceased members of such forces in case such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to this compact, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within such state.

Article 8. Any party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be reimbursed by the party state receiving such aid for any loss or damage to, or expense incurred in

the operation of, any equipment answering a request for aid, and for the cost incurred in connection with such requests; provided, that any aiding party state may assume in whole or in part such loss, damage, expense, or other cost, or may loan such equipment or donate such services to the receiving party state without charge or cost; and provided further that any two or more party states may enter into supplementary agreements establishing a different allocation of costs as among those states. The United States Government may relieve the party state receiving aid from any liability and reimburse the party state supplying civil defense forces for the compensation paid to and the transportation, subsistence and maintenance expenses of such forces during the time of the rendition of such aid or assistance outside the state and may also pay fair and reasonable compensation for the use or utilization of the supplies, materials, equipment or facilities so utilized or consumed.

Article 9. Plans for the orderly evacuation and reception of the civilian population as the result of an emergency or disaster shall be worked out from time to time between representatives of the party states and the various local civil defense areas thereof. Such plans shall include the manner of transporting such evacuees, the number of evacuees to be received in different areas, the manner in which food, clothing, housing, and medical care will be provided, the registration of the evacuees, the providing of facilities for the notification of relatives or friends, and the forwarding of such evacuees to other areas or the bringing in of additional materials, supplies, and all other relevant factors. Such plans shall provide that the party state receiving evacuees shall be reimbursed generally for the out-of-pocket expenses incurred in receiving and caring for such evacuees, and for expenditures for transportation, food, clothing, medicines and medical care and like items. Such expenditures shall be reimbursed by the party state of which the evacuees are residents, or by the United States Government under plans approved by it. After the termination of the emergency or disaster the party state of which the evacuees are resident shall assume the responsibility for the ultimate support or repatriation of such evacuees.

Article 10. This compact shall be available to any state, territory or possession of the United States, and the District of Columbia. The term "state" may also include any neighboring foreign country or province or state thereof.

Article 11. The committee established pursuant to Article 1 of this compact may request the Civil Defense Agency of the United States Government to act as an informational and coordinating body under this compact, and representatives of such agency of the United States Government may attend meetings of such committee.

Article 12. This compact shall become operative immediately upon its ratification by any state as between it and any other state or states so ratifying and shall be subject to approval by Congress unless prior congressional approval has been given. Duly authenticated copies of this compact and of such supplementary agreements as may be entered into shall, at the time of their approval, be deposited with each of the party states and with the Civil Defense Agency and other appropriate agencies of the United States Government.

Article 13. This compact shall continue in force and remain binding on each party state until the Legislature or the Governor of such party state takes action to withdraw therefrom. Such action

shall not be effective until 30 days after notice thereof has been sent by the Governor of the party state desiring to withdraw to the Governors of all other party states.

Article 14. This compact shall be construed to effectuate the purposes stated in Article 1 hereof. If any provision of this compact is declared unconstitutional, or the applicability thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the constitutionality of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Done at the State Capitol in Sacramento, this 10th day of December in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty one.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I hereby affix my signature, pursuant to the authority vested in me by law as Governor of the State of California.

Signed Earl Warren, Governor

178.5. In addition to any other authority conferred upon him, the Governor is authorized and may execute for, on behalf of, and in the name of the State of California, the provisions of Article XV to the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact, which provisions provide as follows:

Article XV. (a) This article shall be in effect only as among those states which have enacted it into law or in which the governors have adopted it pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority sufficient to give it the force of law as part of this compact. Nothing contained in this article or in any supplementary agreement made in implementation thereof shall be construed to abridge, impair or supersede any other provision of this compact or any obligation undertaken by a state pursuant thereto, except that if its terms so provide a supplementary agreement in implementation of this article may modify, expand or add to any such obligation as among the parties to the supplementary agreement.

(b) In addition to the occurrences, circumstances and subject matters to which preceding articles of this compact make it applicable, this compact and the authorizations, entitlements and procedures thereof shall apply to:

1. Searches for and rescue of persons who are lost, marooned, or otherwise in danger.
2. Action useful in coping with disasters arising from any cause or designed to increase the capability to cope with any such disasters.
3. Incidents, or the imminence thereof, which endanger the health or safety of the public and which require the use of special equipment, trained personnel or personnel in larger numbers than are locally available in order to reduce, counteract or remove the danger.
4. The giving and receiving of aid by subdivisions of party states.
5. Exercises, drills or other training or practice activities designed to aid personnel to prepare for, cope with or prevent any disaster or other emergency to which this compact applies.

(c) Except as expressly limited by this compact or a supplementary agreement in force pursuant thereto, any aid authorized by this compact or such supplementary agreement may be furnished by any agency of a party state, a subdivision of such state, or by a joint agency providing such aid shall be entitled to reimbursement therefor to the same extent and in the same manner as a state. The personnel of such a joint agency, when rendering aid pursuant to this compact shall have the same rights, authority and immunity as personnel of party states.

(d) Nothing in this article shall be construed to exclude from the coverage of Articles I-XIV of this compact any matter which, in the absence of this article, could reasonably be construed to be covered thereby.

(e) Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to limit previous or future entry into the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of this state with other states.

# APPENDIX C



## What is EMAC?

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), established in 1996, has weathered the storm when put to the test and stands today as the the cornerstone of mutual aid. The EMAC mutual aid agreement and partnership between states exist because from hurricanes to earthquakes, wildfires to toxic waste spills, and terrorist attacks to biological and chemical incidents, all states share a common enemy: the threat of disaster.

Since being ratified by Congress and signed into law, in 1996, (Public Law 104-321), 49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become members of EMAC. EMAC is the first national disaster-relief compact since the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of 1950 to be ratified by Congress.

The strength of EMAC and the quality that distinguishes it from other plans and compacts lies in [its governance structure](#), its relationship with federal organizations, states, counties, territories, & regions, and the ability to move just about any resource one state has to assist another state, including medical resources.

EMAC offers the following benefits:

- EMAC assistance may be more readily available than other resources.
- EMAC allows for a quick response to disasters using the unique human resources and expertise possessed by member states.
- EMAC offers state-to-state assistance during Governor declared state of emergencies: EMAC offers a responsive and straightforward system for states to send personnel and equipment to help disaster relief efforts in other states. When resources are overwhelmed, EMAC helps to fill the shortfalls.
- EMAC establishes a firm legal foundation: Once the conditions for providing assistance to a requesting state have been set, the terms constitute a legally binding contractual agreement that make affected states responsible for reimbursement. Responding states can rest assured that sending aid will not be a financial or legal burden and personnel sent are protected under workers compensation and liability provisions. The EMAC legislation solves the problems of liability and responsibilities of cost and allows for credentials to be honored across state lines.
- EMAC provides fast and flexible assistance: EMAC allows states to ask for whatever assistance they need for any type of emergency, from earthquakes to acts of terrorism. EMAC's simple procedures help states dispense with bureaucratic wrangling.
- EMAC can move resources other compacts can't - like medical resources.

Thanks to EMAC, states are able to join forces and help one another when they need it the most: whenever disaster strikes!

**Want to learn more about EMAC?** Click on a link below to learn more.

- [Who Administer's EMAC?](#)
- [How does EMAC Work?](#)
- [How can you become Involved in EMAC?](#)
- [EMAC History](#)
- [EMAC Articles](#)
- [EMAC in the News](#)
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**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**



**Emergency Management Assistance Compact  
Deploying Help Across Disciplines**

**Lexington, KY – September 12, 2005** – The types of personnel and resources being deployed under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) state-to-state mutual aid agreement covers the gamut of public as well as human needs in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath.

It has been erroneously reported that EMAC does not coordinate medical resources. In fact, EMAC has deployed a wide range of medical personnel and equipment in a variety of disaster responses, including Hurricane Katrina. Because of the enormity of this hurricane’s devastation, the federal government decided to federalize the medical resource deployment, thereby lifting some of the response burden from the states. However, EMAC continues to assist the government by currently deploying more than a thousand doctors, nurses, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), dentists, ambulances and medivac helicopters.

In addition to medical assistance, EMAC is managing countless other resources in the response effort. These include thousands of National Guard troops; law enforcement; search and rescue, including water; firefighters; hazmat teams; engineering support; air transportation personnel; communications dispatchers; meals, water, ice, baby formula and diapers; satellite and cell phones; debris removal; decontamination trailers and showers; water purification systems; livestock inspection; veterinarians; animal control officers, coroners and many others.

As a result of the hurricane, EMAC is managing the largest deployment of personnel and resources in the compact’s history. Forty-four states have sent more than 43,000 people to Louisiana and Mississippi. All states have offered assistance. Even with Hurricane Katrina’s unprecedented demand for help, EMAC is also putting people in place to respond to Tropical Storm Ophelia. At the request of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), EMAC has sent staff to the FEMA Region IV office. Additional EMAC personnel have been identified for deployment if requested.

EMAC is neither a federal agency nor part of the federal government. It is an agreement among 49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, to provide assistance across state lines when a disaster occurs. The governor of the affected area must first declare a state of emergency, and then that state must request the help it needs. It is this request that triggers the response from other EMAC-member states and sets the EMAC operations system of coordination and deployment in motion. Protocols established in EMAC allow reimbursement to all assisting states. EMAC also has the procedures in place to resolve liability issues.

Established in 1996, EMAC was ratified by Congress and signed into law (Public Law 104-321). It is the first national disaster-relief compact to be ratified by Congress since the Civil Defense Compact of 1950. All members must pass state legislation approving their participation in EMAC. The compact is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA).

**Contact Information**

Angela Copple, EMAC Coordinator, (859)244-8217  
[acopple@csg.org](mailto:acopple@csg.org); <http://www.emacweb.org>

# APPENDIX D

[Please click here to return to the previous page.](#)

## Press Release



OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

GAAS:427:05  
**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**  
09/13/2005

### **Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Emergency Management Assistance Compact Legislation**

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced today that he has signed legislation that makes California party to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), already in place in the 47 other contiguous states. [AB 823](#) by Assemblymembers Pedro Nava (D-Santa Barbara) and Sharon Runner (R-Lancaster) allows states to share emergency response resources immediately during a disaster without having to use valuable time reaching aid agreements.

"When my administration sponsored the Emergency Management Assistance Compact bill earlier this year, it was so that California could join its fellow states in an agreement that facilitates mutual aid in times of disaster. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, I renewed my call for swift passage of this legislation and today I am pleased to sign it into law. This mutual aid compact will allow California to receive help from other states more quickly during a disaster," said Governor Schwarzenegger. "EMAC will also allow us to send aid to Gulf Coast states with greater efficiency as they recover from Hurricane Katrina."

EMAC is the primary legal tool that states use to immediately send and receive emergency personnel and equipment during a major disaster. Prior to adopting EMAC, the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) negotiated governor-to-governor agreements with other states, often lengthening response time.

Also signed by Governor Schwarzenegger was [SB 546](#) by Senator Bob Dutton (R-Rancho Cucamonga), legislation that authorizes OES to promote collaboration between the private and public sectors to better prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters. This legislation allows the state to enter into emergency management agreements with private sector organizations with the goal of reducing the impact of future disasters and speeding recovery efforts.

[Back to Top of Page](#)

[Please click here to return to the previous page.](#)

**Assembly Bill No. 823**

**CHAPTER 233**

An act to add and repeal Article 3.7 (commencing with Section 179) of Chapter 1 of Division 1 of Title 1 of the Government Code, relating to emergencies, and declaring the urgency thereof, to take effect immediately.

[Approved by Governor September 13, 2005. Filed with  
Secretary of State September 13, 2005.]

**LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST**

AB 823, Nava. Disaster response.

Existing law ratifies, approves, and sets forth the provisions of the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact.

This bill would, until March 1, 2007, ratify, approve, and set forth the provisions of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The bill would also require the state to indemnify and make whole any officer or employee who is a resident of California, or his or her heirs, if the officer or employee is injured or killed in another state when rendering aid pursuant to the compact. It would require the Attorney General or other legal counsel provided by the state to defend local government or special district personnel who are officially deployed under the provisions of the compact, as specified, and would require indemnification of these personnel subject to the same conditions and limitations applicable to state employees.

This bill would declare that it is to take effect immediately as an urgency statute.

*The people of the State of California do enact as follows:*

SECTION 1. Article 3.7 (commencing with Section 179) is added to Chapter 1 of Division 1 of Title 1 of the Government Code, to read:

**Article 3.7. Emergency Management Assistance Compact**

179. (a) It is the intent of the State of California to continue its long history of sharing emergency response resources with other states during times of disaster. Californian's have benefited from the assistance provided by the firefighters, law enforcement officers, emergency medical personnel and other emergency staff received from other states during our calamitous fires, earthquakes, winter storms, and other disasters. We must now join our sister states in ensuring we are prepared to aid our people

during emergencies by entering into the Emergency Management Assistance Compact as it was adopted by Congress.

(b) The Emergency Management Assistance Compact as set forth in Section 179.5 is hereby ratified and approved.

179.5. The provisions of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact between the State of California and other states that are parties to the compact referred to in Section 179 are as follows:

#### Article 1. Purposes and Authorities

This compact is made and entered into by and between the participating member states which enact this compact, hereafter called party states. For the purposes of this agreement, the term "states" is taken to mean the several states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and all United States territorial possessions.

The purpose of this compact is to provide for mutual assistance between the states entering into this compact in managing any emergency or disaster that is duly declared by the governor of the affected state, whether arising from natural disaster, technological hazard, manmade disaster, civil emergency aspects of resource shortages, community disorders, insurgency, or enemy attack.

This compact shall also provide for mutual cooperation in emergency-related exercises, testing, or other training activities using equipment and personnel simulating performance of any aspect of the giving and receiving of aid by party states or subdivisions of party states during emergencies, such actions occurring outside actual declared emergency periods. Mutual assistance in this compact may include the use of the states' National Guard forces, either in accordance with the National Guard Mutual Assistance Compact or by mutual agreement between states.

#### Article 2. General Implementation

Each party state entering into this compact recognizes many emergencies transcend political jurisdictional boundaries and that intergovernmental coordination is essential in managing these and other emergencies under this compact. Each state further recognizes that there will be emergencies which require immediate access and present procedures to apply outside resources to make a prompt and effective response to such an emergency. This is because few, if any, individual states have all the resources they may need in all types of emergencies or the capability of delivering resources to areas where emergencies exist.

The prompt, full, and effective utilization of resources of the participating states, including any resources on hand or available from the federal government or any other source, that are essential to the safety,

care, and welfare of the people in the event of any emergency or disaster declared by a party state, shall be the underlying principle on which all articles of this compact shall be understood. On behalf of the governor of each state participating in the compact, the legally designated state official who is assigned responsibility for emergency management will be responsible for formulation of the appropriate interstate mutual aid plans and procedures necessary to implement this compact.

### Article 3. Party State Responsibilities

(a) It shall be the responsibility of each party state to formulate procedural plans and programs for interstate cooperation in the performance of the responsibilities listed in this article. In formulating such plans, and in carrying them out, the party states, insofar as practical, shall:

(1) Review individual state hazards analyses and, to the extent reasonably possible, determine all those potential emergencies the party states might jointly suffer, whether due to natural disaster, technological hazard, manmade disaster, emergency aspects of resource shortages, civil disorders, insurgency, or enemy attack.

(2) Review party states' individual emergency plans and develop a plan which will determine the mechanism for the interstate management and provision of assistance concerning any potential emergency.

(3) Develop interstate procedures to fill any identified gaps and to resolve any identified inconsistencies or overlaps in existing or developed plans.

(4) Assist in warning communities adjacent to or crossing the state boundaries.

(5) Protect and assure uninterrupted delivery of services, medicines, water, food, energy and fuel, search and rescue, and critical lifeline equipment, services, and resources, both human and material.

(6) Inventory and set procedures for the interstate loan and delivery of human and material resources, together with procedures for reimbursement or forgiveness.

(7) Provide, to the extent authorized by law, for temporary suspension of any statutes.

(b) The authorized representative of a party state may request assistance of another party state by contacting the authorized representative of that state. The provisions of this agreement shall only apply to requests for assistance made by and to authorized representatives. Requests may be verbal or in writing. If verbal, the request shall be confirmed in writing within 30 days of the verbal request. Requests shall provide the following information:

(1) A description of the emergency service function for which assistance is needed, including, but not limited to, fire services, law enforcement, emergency medical, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, building inspection, planning and information

assistance, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, and search and rescue.

(2) The amount and type of personnel, equipment, materials and supplies needed, and a reasonable estimate of the length of time they will be needed.

(3) The specific place and time for staging of the assisting party's response and a point of contact at that location.

(c) There shall be frequent consultation between state officials who have assigned emergency management responsibilities and other appropriate representatives of the party states with affected jurisdictions and the United States Government, with free exchange of information, plans, and resource records relating to emergency capabilities.

#### Article 4. Limitations

Any party state requested to render mutual aid or conduct exercises and training for mutual aid shall take such action as is necessary to provide and make available the resources covered by this compact in accordance with the terms hereof; provided that it is understood that the state rendering aid may withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection for such state. Each party state shall afford to the emergency forces of any party state, while operating within its state limits under the terms and conditions of this compact, the same powers (except that of arrest unless specifically authorized by the receiving state), duties, rights, and privileges as are afforded forces of the state in which they are performing emergency services. Emergency forces will continue under the command and control of their regular leaders, but the organizational units will come under the operational control of the emergency services authorities of the state receiving assistance. These conditions may be activated, as needed, only subsequent to a declaration of a state of emergency or disaster by the governor of the party state that is to receive assistance or commencement of exercises or training for mutual aid and shall continue so long as the exercises or training for mutual aid are in progress, the state of emergency or disaster remains in effect, or loaned resources remain in the receiving state, whichever is longer.

#### Article 5. Licenses and Permits

Whenever any person holds a license, certificate, or other permit issued by any state party to the compact evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other skills, and when such assistance is requested by the receiving party state, such person shall be deemed licensed, certified, or permitted by the state requesting assistance to render aid involving such skill to meet a declared emergency or disaster, subject to such limitations and conditions as the governor of the requesting state may prescribe by executive order or otherwise.

#### Article 6. Liability

Officers or employees of a party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes. No party state or its officers or employees rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so engaged or on account of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith. Good faith in this article shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence, or recklessness.

#### Article 7. Supplementary Agreements

Inasmuch as it is probable that the pattern and detail of the machinery for mutual aid among two or more states may differ from that among the states that are party hereto, this instrument contains elements of a broad base common to all states, and nothing herein contained shall preclude any state from entering into supplementary agreements with another state or affect any other agreements already in force between states. Supplementary agreements may comprehend, but shall not be limited to, provisions for evacuation and reception of injured and other persons and the exchange of medical, fire, police, public utility, reconnaissance, welfare, transportation, and communications personnel, and equipment and supplies.

#### Article 8. Compensation

Each party state shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that state and representatives of deceased members of such forces in case such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to this compact, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within their own state.

#### Article 9. Reimbursement

Any party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be reimbursed by the party state receiving such aid for any loss or damage to or expense incurred in the operation of any equipment and the provision of any service in answering a request for aid and for the costs incurred in connection with such requests; provided, that any aiding party state may assume in whole or in part such loss, damage, expense, or other cost, or may loan such equipment or donate such services to the receiving party state without charge or cost; and provided further, that any two or more party states may enter into supplementary agreements establishing a different allocation of costs among those states. Article 8 expenses shall not be reimbursable under this provision.

## Article 10. Evacuation

Plans for the orderly evacuation and interstate reception of portions of the civilian population as the result of any emergency or disaster of sufficient proportions to so warrant, shall be worked out and maintained between the party states and the emergency management/services directors of the various jurisdictions where any type of incident requiring evacuations might occur. Such plans shall be put into effect by request of the state from which evacuees come and shall include the manner of transporting such evacuees, the number of evacuees to be received in different areas, the manner in which food, clothing, housing, and medical care will be provided, the registration of the evacuees, the providing of facilities for the notification of relatives or friends, and the forwarding of such evacuees to other areas or the bringing in of additional materials, supplies, and all other relevant factors. Such plans shall provide that the party state receiving evacuees and the party state from which the evacuees come shall mutually agree as to reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses incurred in receiving and caring for such evacuees, for expenditures for transportation, food, clothing, medicines, and medical care, and like items. Such expenditures shall be reimbursed as agreed by the party state from which the evacuees come. After the termination of the emergency or disaster, the party state from which the evacuees come shall assume the responsibility for the ultimate support of repatriation of such evacuees.

## Article 11. Implementation

(a) This compact shall become operative immediately upon its enactment into law by any two states. Thereafter, this compact shall become effective as to any other state upon its enactment by such state.

(b) Any party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same, but no such withdrawal shall take effect until 30 days after the governor of the withdrawing state has given notice in writing of such withdrawal to the governors of all other party states. Such action shall not relieve the withdrawing state from obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal.

(c) Duly authenticated copies of this compact and of such supplementary agreements as may be entered into shall, at the time of their approval, be deposited with each of the party states and with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other appropriate agencies of the United States Government.

## Article 12. Validity

This act shall be construed to effectuate the purposes stated in Article 1 hereof. If any provision of this compact is declared unconstitutional, or the applicability thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the

constitutionality of the remainder of this act and the applicability thereof to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Article 13. Additional Provisions

Nothing in this compact shall authorize or permit the use of military force by the National Guard of a state at any place outside that state in any emergency for which the President is authorized by law to call into federal service the militia, or for any purpose for which the use of the Army or the Air Force would in the absence of express statutory authorization be prohibited under Section 1385 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

179.7. (a) Notwithstanding Article 6 of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, as set forth in Section 179.5, the state shall indemnify and make whole any officer or employee who is a resident of California, or his or her heirs, if the officer or employee is injured or killed in another state when rendering aid pursuant to the compact, as if the act or acts occurred in California, less any recovery obtained under the provisions of Article 6 of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.

(b) Local government or special district personnel who are officially deployed under the provisions of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact pursuant to an assignment of the Office of Emergency Services shall be defended by the Attorney General or other legal counsel provided by the state, and shall be indemnified subject to the same conditions and limitations applicable to state employees.

179.9. This article shall become inoperative on March 1, 2007, and, as of January 1, 2008, is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that becomes operative on or before January 1, 2008, deletes or extends the dates on which it becomes inoperative and is repealed.

SEC. 2. This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting the necessity are:

In order to ensure at the earliest possible time that the state is aided by other states and is prepared to meet any emergency or disaster declared by the Governor, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately.

# APPENDIX E



CONTACT: Lt. Joe Whiteford  
(916) 657-7202

Media Relations Office  
2555 First Avenue  
Sacramento, CA 95818

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**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

September 4, 2005

05-33

## **CHP OFFICERS LEAVE FOR HURRICANE DISASTER ZONE**

This morning, 116 California Highway Patrol officers departed for the devastated southeastern United States. The officers will work directly with the Louisiana State Police on a multi-faceted mission involving patrol activities, protection of evacuation camps, escorting supply convoys, and assisting with evacuations of inhabitants from the devastated areas. CHP patrol units will be traveling in convoy to Tucson, Arizona where they will be housed overnight, continuing on to Louisiana the following day.

The deployment is in response to a mutual aid request from authorities in Louisiana which was immediately signed by Governor Schwarzenegger. "At the direction of Governor Schwarzenegger, the State of California stands ready to help our fellow citizens in the Southeast. The CHP will do whatever we can to help the victims of this terrible disaster," said CHP Commissioner Mike Brown.

The CHP officers are part of the Department's Special Operations Team and will take with them 40 uniquely equipped all-terrain vehicles and three helicopters. The officers and equipment are being deployed from throughout the state. The CHP contingent departed from the CHP Academy in West Sacramento as a unit.

Arrangements can be made starting Tuesday for members of the California media wishing to interview or photograph the CHP contingent in Louisiana by calling Lieutenant Joe Whiteford of CHP's Office of Media Relations at (916) 657-7202 or (916) 208-5974.

# # # #



# NEWS

CONTACT: Tom Marshall  
(916) 657-7202

Media Relations Office  
2555 First Avenue  
Sacramento, CA 95818

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**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

September 29, 2005

05-42

## **CHP Officers Return From Humanitarian Duty In Louisiana**

(SACRAMENTO) -- Completing the California Highway Patrol's (CHP) 28-day tour of aid in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a final contingent of 117 CHP officers returned home to California this morning at the Ontario Airport. Overall, a total of 234 CHP personnel were deployed to the flood stricken area during the past four weeks.

"I personally want to commend each of these CHP officers for their selfless dedication to the relief efforts and for representing the compassion and concern of all Californians," stated Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Upon leaving the Louisiana command center, CHP Deputy Chief John Fogerty presented two checks to the Louisiana Troopers Association. One check of more than \$4,000 consisted of personal contributions from CHP employees who had been deployed to the hurricane ravaged area. A second check for \$75,000 was donated by the 11-99 Foundation, a private non-profit organization that helps CHP employees and families in times of need.

"The committed service and generosity of these CHP officers speaks volumes of their integrity and character," said Secretary Sunne Wright McPeak of the Business, Transportation & Housing Agency that oversees the CHP.

The 234 CHP officers, 40 patrol vehicles and 3 aircraft that were deployed to the Gulf Region aided in the rescue of countless stranded victims and assisted in the arrest of several looters. Officers also performed routine patrols and other law enforcement duties alongside their counterparts with the Louisiana State Police through a mutual aid agreement. It is estimated that the four week CHP deployment cost nearly \$4 million. The funds will be reimbursed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

"We're proud that we were able to provide some assistance and comfort to the people of Louisiana during their immediate recovery effort," said CHP Commissioner Mike Brown. "California is unfortunately familiar with the devastation that natural disasters can bring."

California has deployed/mobilized more than 1,500 personnel for the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort. Now with the CHP back in California, 740 California National Guard, 222 Urban Search and Rescue, and 120 California Conservation Corps personnel remain in the Gulf Region.

###

# APPENDIX F

|                                                                                           |                                                                                            |                                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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# Mission/Request Tasking Form

Mission Type: Standard

**Mission Number: 2005-OES4026 Priority: High**

Created by: Brian Abeel on: 09/03/2005 07:15:15 AM

Last Modified by: Kimberly Lorenz on: 09/11/2005 03:57 PM

Approved By Sharron Leason (Sharron Leason) on: 09/03/2005 08:34:29 AM

This is an **Final** Request

**This field must be set to *Final* before it can be submitted to State OES for approval, and in order for Mission approval/validation buttons and field edits to properly function. Initial Missions will only appear in the *Initial Requests* view.**

Unique ID:6FVJQK

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                 |                                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <b>Mission Overview</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                 |                                   |
| Operational Area: Out-of-State                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | <b>2. Related Event/Disaster:</b><br>E - CA Response to Katrina |                                   |
| <b>3 Desired Arrival Date/Time:</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>a. Date:</b> 09/03/2005                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | <b>*b. Time:</b> 1200                                           | <b>c. Estimated Duration:</b> TBD |
| <b>4. Mission Type:</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                 |                                   |
| Law                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>5. Threat:</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                 |                                   |
| Potential threat of death or serious injury                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>6. * Situation:</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                 |                                   |
| Hurricane Katrina law enforcement response.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>7. Requested Mission:</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                 |                                   |
| Request to CHP to provide law enforcement to Louisiana State Patrol under Interstate and Civil Defense Compact Agreement. Equipment and personnel requested: 4 Helicopters, 2 Fixed Wing, 100 law enforcement officers, 25 vehicles. 1 of 4 helicopters filled by L.A. County Sheriff's. In preparation for this an advance evaluation team was dispatched 9/3/05 at 0530 to Baton Rouge. The evaluation team consisted of: 1 CHP fixed wing aircraft, 6 personnel, including 1 state OES Law Enforcement personnel (Bob Gerber). |                                                                 |                                   |
| 9/3/2005 1530 hrs the amount of vehicles needed has been ungraded from 25 to 30.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                 |                                   |
| 9/4/2005 0700 hrs CHP deploying resources today to travel to Louisiana.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                 |                                   |
| 9/4/2005 1558 hours vehicles and personnel have left from CHP Academy this morning. Helicopters will be leaving tomorrow morning. 2 Fixed-Wing Aircraft has been cancelled.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                 |                                   |
| 9/5/2005 0830 hrs update OES Bob Gerber remains on scene @ Louisiana State EOC. CHP deployed officers by ground with vehicles on 9/4/2005. Aircraft departed today 9/5/2005                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                 |                                   |
| 10/7/05 - All personnel and resources have returned. Mission is closed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>8. Additional Resource Information:</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                 |                                   |
| 9/11/05 -As per MSGT Apis CNG JOC<br>On Sept 15, 116 CHP will be transported from March AFB to Baton Rouge LA<br>On Sept 16, 112 CHP will be transported from Baton Rouge LA to Travis AFB<br>On Sept 28, 106 CHP will be transported from Baton Rouge LA to March AFB<br>10/7/05 - All personnel and resources have returned. Mission is closed.                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>9. Reporting Location:</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>a. *Address:</b> TBD                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>10. Requesting Agency:</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                 |                                   |
| <b>a. * Name:</b><br>Sharron Leason                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <b>b. * Position:</b><br>Deputy Director - SOC                  | <b>c. * Agency:</b><br>OES        |

|                                                            |                        |                       |
|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>d. * Phone Number:</b><br>916-845-8831                  | e. Fax Number:         | f. Pager/Alt#:        |
| <b>11. Forwarding Agency: (If different from Block 10)</b> |                        |                       |
| a. Name:                                                   | b. Position:           | c. Agency:            |
| d. Phone Number:                                           | e. Fax Number:         | f. Pager/Alt#:        |
| <b>12. Incident/Proj Order No.:</b>                        | a. AFRCC Incident No.: | b. AFRCC Mission No.: |
| Notification Forwarding Agency:<br>To:                     |                        |                       |
| CC: Send Email                                             |                        |                       |
| <b>REQUEST MISSION APPROVAL:</b>                           |                        |                       |
| <b>Select OES Office/Duty Officer:</b><br>OES              |                        |                       |

Governor's Office of Emergency Services: Blocks 13 through 16 to be filled out by the Governor's OES only.

Overall Mission/Resource Status  
Complete

|                                                                    |                                     |                           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>13. OES Coordinator:</b>                                        |                                     |                           |
| a. Name:                                                           | b. OES Office:                      | c. Phone:                 |
| d. Fax/Cell:                                                       | e. Pager/Alt#:                      | f. Other:                 |
| <b>14. Responding Agency:</b>                                      |                                     |                           |
| a. Agency Name: If selection not in list above, enter here:<br>CHP | b. Agency POC:<br>Sgt. David Qualls | c. Phone:<br>916-657-8287 |
| d. Fax Number:                                                     | e. Pager/Alt#:                      | f. Other:                 |

**15. Detailed Resource List (To be filled out by the Responding Agency or OES) ?**

[Create Resource](#)

| Request # | Resource Type | Quantity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Providing Agency  | Status            | Location / Destination | ETA |
|-----------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----|
| N/A       | N/A           | Evaluation team: 1 fixed-wind CHP aircraft, 6 personnel, including one state OES law enforcement personnel; 4 Helicopters, 2 fixed-wing aircraft, 100 law enforcement officers, 25 vehicles.<br>9/4/2005 - 2 Fixed-Wing Aircraft request within this mission has been cancelled | CHP<br>(Unit: NA) | New Resource Item | TBD                    | TBD |

**16. Approval Details**  
a. Responsible OES Branch/Region: OES  
b. Approver's Name: Sharron Leon

|                                                                                          |                                                                                           |                                                                                             |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <br>Edit | <br>Close | <br>Print |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Mission/Request Tasking Form

Mission Type: Standard

**Mission Number: 2005-OES4031 Priority: High**

Created by: Brian Abeel on: 09/04/2005 09:52:20 AM

Last Modified by: Kimberly Lorenz on: 09/26/2005 12:01 PM

Approved By Sharron Leاون (Sharron Leاون) on: 09/04/2005 12:52:13 PM

This is an **Final** Request

**This field must be set to *Final* before it can be submitted to State OES for approval, and in order for Mission approval/validation buttons and field edits to properly function. Initial Missions will only appear in the *Initial Requests* view.**

Unique ID:6FWMSQ

### Mission Overview

Operational Area: Out-of-State

**2. Related Event/Disaster:**  
E - CA Response to Katrina

### 3 Desired Arrival Date/Time:

a. Date: 09/15/2005 

\*b. Time: 0900

c. Estimated Duration: September 16, 2005

### 4. Mission Type:

Transport-Air

### 5. Threat:

Potential threat of death or serious injury

### 6. \* Situation:

Hurricane Katrina Operations Response

### 7. Requested Mission:

CHP is requesting a new mission request for CNG to provide air transport to rotate their contingent in two weeks.

Requested mission: on 9-15-05, transport 110 officers and personal equipment from March Air Force Base (Riverside) to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Then return 110 officers and personal equipment to Travis Air Force Base (Solano) on Sept. 16. This request is for personnel only. There are no vehicles included in this request- strictly a swap out of people.

CHP Division Chiefs have indicated a 0900 departure from March AFB.

Additional transport request for 110 personnel & equipment from Baton Rouge to March AFB on September 28th.

9/17/05 - CHP has requested the remaining flight be changed to September 29th to accommodate 119 personnel. CNG has been notified of this change and is working on this request.

9/26/05 - Transport of CHP personnel on 29 September from Baton Rouge to March AFB is critical to the on-going operational readiness and response posture of the California Highway Patrol for public safety and Homeland Security. Failure to execute air transport of CHP personnel will result in severely diminishing public safety service while incurring significant personnel and equipment costs in returning law enforcement mutual aid to the State of Louisiana by ground.

10/7/05 - All personnel and resources have returned - mission closed.

### 8. Additional Resource Information:

9/11/05 -As per MSGT Apis CNG JOC

On Sept 15, 116 CHP will be transported from March AFB to Baton Rouge LA

On Sept 16, 112 CHP will be transported from Baton Rouge LA to Travis AFB

On Sept 28, 106 CHP will be transported from Baton Rouge LA to March AFB

9/26/05 CORRECTION: Return flight to be on 29 September. CNG, OES Law Enforcement Branch and CHP coordinating transport specifics.

10/7/05 - All personnel and resources have returned - mission closed.

### 9. Reporting Location:

a. \*Address: March Air Force Base (Riverside);  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Travis Air Force Base  
(Solano)

### 10. Requesting Agency:

|                                                                                                  |                                                |                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>a. * Name:</b><br>sharron Leاون                                                               | <b>b. * Position:</b><br>Deputy Director - SOC | <b>c. * Agency:</b><br>OES |
| <b>d. * Phone Number:</b><br>916-845-8831                                                        | e. Fax Number:                                 | f. Pager/Alt#:             |
| <b>11. Forwarding Agency: (If different from Block 10)</b>                                       |                                                |                            |
| a. Name:<br>Sgt. Doug Milligan                                                                   | b. Position:<br>CHP ENTAC                      | c. Agency:<br>CHP          |
| d. Phone Number:<br>916-657-8287                                                                 | e. Fax Number:                                 | f. Pager/Alt#:             |
| <b>12. Incident/Proj Order No.:</b>                                                              | a. AFRCC Incident No.:                         | b. AFRCCMission No.:       |
| Notification Forwarding Agency:<br>To:                                                           |                                                |                            |
| CC: Send Email  |                                                |                            |
| <b>REQUEST MISSION APPROVAL:</b>                                                                 |                                                |                            |
| Select OES Office/Duty Officer:<br>OES                                                           |                                                |                            |

Governor's Office of Emergency Services: Blocks 13 through 16 to be filled out by the Governor's OES only.

Overall Mission/Resource Status  
Complete

| <b>13. OES Coordinator:</b>                                                            |                  |                                     |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| a. Name:                                                                               | b. OES Office:   | c. Phone:                           |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
| d. Fax/Cell:                                                                           | e. Pager/Alt#:   | f. Other:                           |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
| <b>14. Responding Agency:</b>                                                          |                  |                                     |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
| a. Agency Name: If selection not in list above, enter here:<br>CNG                     |                  | b. Agency POC:<br>1st Sgt Glen King |                   | c. Phone:<br>916-845-8856 |                                                                                             |           |
| d. Fax Number:                                                                         |                  | e. Pager/Alt#:                      |                   | f. Other:                 |                                                                                             |           |
| <b>15. Detailed Resource List (To be filled out by the Responding Agency or OES) ?</b> |                  |                                     |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
| <a href="#">Create Resource</a>                                                        |                  |                                     |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
| Request #                                                                              | Resource Type    | Quantity                            | Providing Agency  | Status                    | Location/Destination                                                                        | ETA       |
| N/A                                                                                    | Aircraft - Other | 1                                   | CNG<br>(Unit: NA) | New Resource Item         | March Air Force Base (Riverside);<br>Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Travis Air Force Base (Solano) | 9/16/2005 |
| <b>16. Approval Details</b>                                                            |                  |                                     |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
| a. Responsible OES Branch/Region: OES                                                  |                  |                                     |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
| b. Approver's Name: Sharron Leاون                                                      |                  |                                     |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |
| c. Designee's Name:                                                                    |                  |                                     |                   |                           |                                                                                             |           |



# Department of Public Safety and Corrections

*Public Safety Services*

KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO  
GOVERNOR

September 5, 2005  
0000/201/HLW/1092

HENRY L. WHITEHORN, COLONEL  
DEPUTY SECRETARY, PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES  
SUPERINTENDENT, OFFICE OF STATE POLICE

Henry Renteria, Director  
California Governor's Office of Emergency Services  
3650 Schriever Avenue  
Mather, California 95655

Dear Director Renteria:

As you know we are in the midst of a major catastrophe. We have asked for and received law enforcement mutual aid from several states including California; I am profoundly grateful for your agency's assistance. I am in the process of establishing a group of law enforcement tactical and emergency management planners to assist my Incident Commander and his command staff.

I would like to request, in accordance with our Governor's letter to Governor Schwarzenegger dated 3 September, 2005 the assistance of Assistant Chief Dennis Beene. I am aware of his extensive law enforcement emergency planning experience and I believe he would be a value to our disaster response planning operations.

Again, I appreciate your support and I look forward to your prompt reply to my request. Please contact my Incident Commander Lt. Colonel Joseph Booth at (225) 922-2293 for any questions or further information.

Sincerely,

Colonel Henry L. Whitehorn  
Superintendent  
Louisiana State Police



Charles Simpson/OES  
08/31/2005 04:50 PM

To pspringer@chp.ca.gov, yconklin@lasd.org,  
cplummer@co.alameda.ca.us, bstrand@co.shasta.ca.us,  
bcknerb@stanislaussheriff.com, cwylie@fresno.ca.gov,  
cc Bob Gerber/OES@OES, Dennis Beene/OES@OES, Joe  
Petersen/OES@OES, Matthew Scharper/OES@OES,  
Michael Griffin/OES@OES, Patricia.Livingston@oes.ca.gov,  
bcc

Subject NSA Response to Hurricane Katrina

State of California  
Governor's Office of Emergency Services  
Law Enforcement Branch

**TRANSMITTAL**

**TO: REGIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID COORDINATORS**

|                    |                               |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| Leroy D. Baca      | Region I Coordinator          |
| Bob Brooks         | Region I-A Coordinator        |
| Charles C. Plummer | Region II Coordinator         |
| Jim Pope           | Region III Coordinator        |
| Mark Puthoff       | Interim Region IV Coordinator |
| Richard Pierce     | Region V Coordinator          |
| Gary Penrod        | Region VI Coordinator         |

**COPY: Mike Brown Commissioner, California Highway  
Patrol**

**NOTE: PLEASE DELIVER TO REGIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  
COORDINATOR**

**Please forward and distribute to the OES Law Enforcement Regional Coordinator  
and OES Law Enforcement Operational Area Coordinators within your region.**

**Please insure that the OES Law Enforcement Operational Area Coordinators  
forward and distribute to local Police Agencies within their Operational Areas.**

**FROM: Charlie Simpson, Chief  
OES Law Enforcement Branch**

**DATE:** August 31, 2005


**SUBJECT:** National Sheriffs Association Response to the Gulf Coast Disaster

The National Sheriff's Association has distributed the letter below, requesting local response to the Gulf Coast region. It is admirable to provide whatever assistance you and your department may have available. However, if you choose to respond to this request, it will be at your own discretion. You may be ineligible for some benefits of coverage from the State of California without an official request to our Governor from another state.

Although California has not signed on to the EMAC system as outlined in the NSA letter, we are communicating to EMAC representatives and are ready to respond to any requests that come through that process.

I encourage you to use and support the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System. When we receive any requests for out of state response, we will contact you to determine the resources available in your region.

*Serving Our Nation's Sheriffs Since 1940*



**NATIONAL SHERIFFS**

1450 DUKE STREET ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22304  
[WWW.SHERIFFS.ORG](http://WWW.SHERIFFS.ORG)

THOMAS N. FAUST  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

August 31, 2005

Dear Sheriff:

Response to the request for assistance to aid sheriffs in areas devastated by Hurricane Katrina has been phenomenal. Additional agencies are still needed. I would like to address general questions which have been received thus far.

✓ **How many deputies are needed?** Whatever a Sheriff's Office can spare for immediate response. The responding deputies must be self-sufficient for a minimum of 3 days (patrol car, equipment, food, water, clothing, shelter). Pack your sleeping bag and pup tent. Two deputies per patrol car are allowable.

✓ **How long are we needed?** This will be a long term operation. Deputies will be needed for a minimum 3 days to a maximum of what a Sheriff's Office will allow. We will also be scheduling replacements until the State of Emergency has ended.

✓ **Do we get re-imbursed?** We are gathering Sheriff's Offices with personnel and resources and contacting Sheriff's Office with needs to marry them up. We then ask the requesting agency to have their EMA Director place the responding Sheriff's Office name in the EMAC system specifically naming the responding agency. The request should be routed to the State EMA, then to the responding State EMA to the local EMA of the responding agency with a FEMA tracking number. **NOTE: YOU MAY NOT BE REIMBURSED WITHOUT A FEMA TRACKING NUMBER!**

✓ **Supplies needed by victims and Sheriff's deputies in devastated jurisdictions:** Bottled water, Non-perishable food, batteries, flashlights, baby needs (formula and diapers), cell phones, new blankets, law enforcement resources such as command posts, generators, boats, aviation.

My office is coordinating the response. Please feel free to contact me at 205-752-0616, cell phone 205-799-2911, email [tsexton@tuscco.com](mailto:tsexton@tuscco.com), Lt. Eric Bailey, 205-752-0616, ext 620, cell phone 205-242-6277, email [ebailey@tuscco.com](mailto:ebailey@tuscco.com), Elaine Gray, 205-752-0616, ext 603. Our office hours are 8:30-5:00 central standard time. Any needs after this hour should be sent to one of the above listed cell phones, or to our communications divisions and clearly state what you need.

Thanks

*Edmund M. Ted Sexton, Sr.*

Edmund M. "Ted" Sexton, Sr., Sheriff  
President, NSA

Activation Procedure for deployment of County Sheriff and Local Law Enforcement  
Resources for Hurricane Katrina through Emergency Management Assistance Compact  
Interstate Mutual Aid  
September 2, 2005  
Page 2

All Req-A PART 2's will be completed by the State EMA and Sheriff and Local Law Enforcement, listing their resources as identified in the criteria noted above. The providing state will procure the signature of the EMAC authorized representative. The signed PART 2 will be handled according to EMAC guidelines and forwarded to the Louisiana EMAC Desk for approval and completion of PART 3.

Once a Req A is officially completed, the designated contact for the Sheriff's office or Local Law Enforcement will contact the Louisiana Sheriff's Task Force in Baton Rouge for duty assignment, Incident commander, and staging area.

Louisiana Sheriff's Task Force contact information


Phone: 225-644-8715 or 225-644-0212

E-mail: [cp@ascensionsheriff.com](mailto:cp@ascensionsheriff.com)

Fax: ~~225-644-8804~~ ~~225-925-9498~~

Sheriff's or Local Law Enforcement resources, once committed under EMAC, will be assigned for deployment, tracking, operational assignment, and demobilization to be handled in entirety by the Louisiana Sheriff's Task Force.

CALL THE LA-EOC EMAC DESK FOR CLARIFICATION 225-925-7478 OR EMAIL  
AT [laemac@ohsep.louisiana.gov](mailto:laemac@ohsep.louisiana.gov)



Sharron Leاون/OES  
09/02/2005 03:57 PM

To "Charles Simpson" <charles.simpson@oes.ca.gov>

cc

bcc

Subject Fw: EMAC Broadcast: Request 500 Flatboats w/ LE Operators: Hurricane

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld  
Warning Center

**From:** Warning Center  
**Sent:** 09/02/2005 03:30 PM  
**To:** Eileen Baumgardner; Sharron Leاون  
**Subject:** Fw: EMAC Broadcast: Request 500 Flatboats w/ LE Operators:  
Hurricane

----- Forwarded by Warning Center/OES on 09/02/2005 03:30 PM -----



"EMAC Broadcast -  
laemac@ohsep.louisiana.gov  
<broadcast@emacweb.org>

To warning.center@oes.ca.gov

cc

09/02/2005 03:13 PM

Subject EMAC Broadcast: Request 500 Flatboats w/ LE Operators:  
Hurricane

Urgent Announcement

Subject: **Request 500 Flatboats w/ LE Operators**

Event: **Hurricane Katrina - Louisiana**

09/02/2005  
06:13 PM EST

Tracking Number: 2005-92-SR333

Impacted States:

Description  
This request is from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. Request is for immediate response of 500 Flatboats with Certified LE

Operators for search and rescue and recovery operation in New Orleans. They should be packaged as Task Force resources. These officers must be self-supported and provide all equipment including personal protective equipment. Fuel is available. Resupply is available after 3 days depending upon item. POC for further information on this request is: Major Jeff Mayne at 225-925-7701

Contact:

Joel Cochran  
Louisiana EMAC Desk  
  
(225) 925-7453  
laemac@ohsep.louisiana.gov

[IMAGE]

This notification has been sent via the EMAC website located at <http://www.emacweb.org>

Patrol

Steve Szalay

Executive Director, CSSA

**FROM:** Charlie Simpson, Chief  
Law Enforcement Branch

**DATE:** September 2, 2005

**SUBJECT:** Louisiana Request for Boats

**The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has submitted a request nationwide for 500 Flatboats with Law Enforcement Operators. The request is as follows:**

"This request is from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. Request is for immediate response of 500 Flatboats with Certified LE Operators for search and rescue and recovery operation in New Orleans. The should be packaged as Task Force resources. These officer must be self-supported and provide all equipment including personal protective equipment. Fuel is available. Resupply is available after 3 day depending upon item."

**I anticipate any resources sent from California to prepare for at least three weeks deployment. This deployment will be by ground transportation.**

**Please query the Operational Areas and Police Agencies within you region to see if any department is willing to send any of these resources. Please respond by e-mail and I will contact you directly with response details:**

**Charles.simpson@oes.ca.gov .**

Charlie Simpson, Chief  
Law Enforcement Branch  
Office: 916-845-8702  
24 Hour : 916-845-8911



Charles Simpson/OES

09/03/2005 06:51 AM

To Bruce Macedo, Greg Orr, Bill Heyne, Chris Carmine, Glenn Grabiec, Eileen Baumgardner, Sharron Leason/OES  
cc "Geoff Dean" <Geoff.Dean@ventura.org>, "Laura Hernandez" <Laura.Hernandez@ventura.org>, "Mark Ball" <Mark.Ball@ventura.org>, "Mark Ritchie"  
bcc

Subject Flatboat Response Update

To update each of you on the potential deployment of flatboats to Louisiana:

I contacted the Louisiana Command Center at 0630 hours and made the tentative offer of the resources you have said may be available for deployment to that state. They are fielding responses from all over the US, and are trying to coordinate to bring the closest boats first. They asked we standby until they determine whether they need our boats, too.

Thanks to each of you for your prompt inventory and reply.

Charlie Simpson, Chief  
Law Enforcement Branch  
Office: 916-845-8702  
24 Hour : 916-845-8911



Charles Simpson/OES  
09/01/2005 11:37 AM

To pspringer@chp.ca.gov, yconklin@lasd.org,  
cplummer@co.alameda.ca.us, bstrand@co.shasta.ca.us,  
bcknerb@stanislaussheriff.com, ggrabiec@sbcscd.org,  
cc Bob Gerber/OES@OES, Dennis.Beene@oes.ca.gov,  
Matthew Scharper/OES@OES, Michael Griffin/OES@OES,  
Tom Murray/OES@OES, Paul Walters/OES@OES, Paula  
bcc

Subject URGENT: Possible Gulf Coast Deployment

State of California  
Governor's Office of Emergency Services  
Law Enforcement Branch

**TRANSMITTAL**

**TO: REGIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID COORDINATORS**

|                    |                               |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| Leroy D. Baca      | Region I Coordinator          |
| Bob Brooks         | Region I-A Coordinator        |
| Charles C. Plummer | Region II Coordinator         |
| Jim Pope           | Region III Coordinator        |
| Mark Puthoff       | Interim Region IV Coordinator |
| Richard Pierce     | Region V Coordinator          |
| Gary Penrod        | Region VI Coordinator         |

**COPY:** Mike Brown Commissioner, California Highway  
Patrol

**FROM:** Charlie Simpson  
State Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Chief

**DATE:** September 1, 2005

**SUBJECT: POSSIBLE GULF COAST LAW ENFORCEMENT DEPLOYMENT**

**REGIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID COORDINATOR CONFERENCE  
CALL- 1400 HOURS TODAY - 916-262-3289**

The Federal Emergency Management Agency has given us a "heads up" that there will be a nationwide request for 3,000 uniformed police officers to respond to Louisiana. I expect California Law Enforcement will rise to this request and provide a significant number of officers.

There are a multitude of logistical issues in the ground deployment of this many officers which remain to be resolved. In the meantime, I would request you alert the Operational

**Area Law Enforcement Coordinators, who in turn will alert all local law enforcement agencies to determine possible availability.**

**PLEASE CANVASS YOUR AGENCIES TO DETERMINE THE POSSIBLE NUMBER OF OFFICERS THAT MAY BE AVAILABLE TO RESPOND TO THIS REQUEST.**

**PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS ALERT.**

Charlie Simpson, Chief  
Law Enforcement Branch  
Office: 916-845-8702  
24 Hour : 916-845-8911



Charles Simpson/OES

09/01/2005 12:14 PM

To pspringer@chp.ca.gov, yconklin@lasd.org,  
cplummer@co.alameda.ca.us, bstrand@co.shasta.ca.us,  
bcknerb@stanislaussheriff.com, ggrabiec@sbcscd.org,  
cc Bob Gerber/OES@OES, Dennis.Beene@oes.ca.gov,  
Matthew Scharper/OES@OES, Michael Griffin/OES@OES,  
Tom Murray/OES@OES, Paul Walters/OES@OES, Paula  
bcc

Subject CANCEL RMAC CONFERENCE CALL

**The State of Louisiana has determined they will use the National Guard to meet their short term law enforcement needs. The anticipated request for 3,000 officers has been cancelled.**

**The conference call scheduled for 1400 hours is cancelled.**

**We stand ready to coordinate any request for law enforcement resources through the Mutual Aid system.**



GOVERNOR'S GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 2005-01

TO: The Adjutant General, State of California

In light of the national emergency that exists by reason of Hurricane Katrina and to ensure the safety of citizens in the United States, I am issuing the following General Order:

Pursuant to Section 146 of the California Military and Veterans Code, I am ordering you to call into Active State Service such as forces of the active militia that are needed to respond to this emergency.

You shall coordinate with the Adjutant General of the impacted states to determine when such personnel and other resources are needed to provide personnel and equipment within the impacted states. Personnel and equipment shall be deployed to the impacted states in accordance with a signed compact between California and the impacted states. You will select only those units that the Department of Defense has not designated for federalization in support of military operations within the United States or abroad.

You will provide a daily Situation Report that will include recommended activation, the number and types of units deployed, as well as the number of personnel available for additional activations. Notify me if additional resources or directions are required.

This order remains in effect until 30 June 2006, unless earlier rescinded or further extended.

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger  
Commander-in-Chief

**LAZZARO, JAMES S**

---

**From:** Houston, Heather  
**Sent:** Friday, September 02, 2005 2:56 PM  
**To:** OLSEN, BRADLEY P; HAYS, CHRISTIAN W; MUNOZ, DANIEL J; ZAMBRANA-SUTTON, GRACE V; Houston, Heather; EARL, JANELL B; ELLIS, MICHAEL J; DYBALL, SHAWN D; HOWESON, STEVEN M; GREENBERG, STUART A; LAZZARO, JAMES S; LEDBETTER, CHRISTOPHER M  
**Subject:** FW: LE Officers Needed For Katrina Deployment: \$400/day

Is there anyone out there who can teach me to get over the wall?!! hh

---

**From:** bounce-816-1080@lyris.s2Institute.com [mailto:bounce-816-1080@lyris.s2Institute.com] **On Behalf Of** S2 Institute Newsletter  
**Sent:** Friday, September 02, 2005 14:20  
**To:** Houston, Heather  
**Subject:** LE Officers Needed For Katrina Deployment: \$400/day

**NEEDED: Certified law Enforcement Officers for Contract Deployment to Louisiana**

Critical Intervention Services, a Clearwater-based security and consulting firm, is actively recruiting certified law enforcement officers for a special deployment in Louisiana in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Officers deployed on this assignment will be protecting staging areas for power restoration teams and utility trucks in the field.

Officers will be billeted in a controlled environment and provided with all operational necessities. Officers are expected to possess current LE certification, personal sidearm, and personal gear. Transportation to the operational area will be provided by CIS.

For information about Critical Intervention Services, please visit our web site:  
<http://www.cisworldservices.org>.

**Start Date:** 9/3/05 (ASAP)

**Estimated Duration:** Until October 1, 2005

**Pay Rate:** \$400 per day (Day Rate)

**Requirements:** Current LE certification, personal gear, and personal side arm

**Contact:** Tim O'Rourke, Tel. (727) 461-9417 / (727) 463-3515

9/2/2005

MSG SPHQ000 0F99B2 SPHQ002 004E8E 20050906 10:50:28

SEND ALE LALSP0000 AP,

ATTENTION: ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES  
FROM: LOUISIANA STATE POLICE HEADQUARTERS  
SUBJECT: OFFERED SUPPORT

WE ARE CURRENTLY REQUESTING THAT ALL AGENCIES DISCONTINUE SENDING LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT TO THE LOUISIANA STATE POLICE FOR THE RELIEF EFFORTS IN LOUISIANA REGARDING THE HURRICANE KATRINA DISASTER.

WE ARE PRESENTLY COORDINATING STAFFING FOR A 90 DAY SCHEDULE OF DEPLOYMENT AND WILL NEED ADDITIONAL SUPPORT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PLEASE CONTACT THE LSP EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER FOR COORDINATION PRIOR TO SENDING ANY SUPPORT.

WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF SUPPORT THAT HAS BEEN PROVIDED AND WE WILL NEED FURTHER SUPPORT FOR OUR LONG TERM PLANS.

POINT OF CONTACT: LOUISIANA STATE POLICE EOC 225.287.7752

AUTH COL H. WHITEHORN

LSP HQ COMM 09062005

10:20

OPER PIERCE



